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CONTENTS
The outstanding world market success of East and Southeast Asian countries (ESAEs) pro-
vides lessons for Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) striving to penetrate
Western markets, even though starting conditions were strikingly different between these
country groups. While ESAEs enjoyed the reputation of stable domestic policies, CEECs
had to deal with institution building, macroeconomic stabilization and privatization at the
same time.
First of all, sound macroeconomic policies and an unrestricted access to domestic and im-
ported inputs are absolutely vital for exporters. These factors cannot be substituted for by
specific export incentives. Furthermore, Asian experience suggests that such incentives
should be granted on a temporary basis in order to discourage rent-seeking and minimize
the budgetary burden.
Export processing zones are ineffective if they do not exert competitive pressure on the
rest of the economy via input and output linkages. Stimulating exports through direct ex-
port subsidies has become less important in ESAEs over time because of inconsistency with
the GATT and the retaliatory actions of trading partners. Using such subsidies is further
constrained in the case of CEECs: Subsidies would conflict with the Europe Agreements,
which require that state aid and competition rules harmonize with EU regulations.
Foreign direct investment can play an important role in enhancing export growth and diver-
sification, especially if such investment is attracted by favourable market prospects rather
than tax holidays. Export promotion by governments should preferably concentrate on
institutional support aimed at reducing the information costs faced by local suppliers and
foreign importers.
Asia's world market success was accompanied by increasing diversification and technolo-
gical sophistication of exports. Intra-regional networking in terms of trade and investment
helped this process considerably. For CEECs, it is thus essential to enhance local technolo-
gical capabilities in order to enable exporters to apply new technologies. Furthermore, the
prospects for a market-driven integration between CEECs can be improved to the extent
that mobility of goods and factors of production is allowed for.
Economic transformation in CEECs involves policy challenges which clearly go beyond ex-
port promotion as in Asia. Moreover, CEECs are facing an uphill struggle against established
suppliers on Western markets. Under such conditions, CEECs are well advised not to follow
the Asian way of maintaining national sovereignty in trade-related policies. Rather, they
had to commit themselves to internationally binding trade liberalization in order to enhance
the credibility of their transformation policies. Such commitments were made on a regional
basis within the EU framework of Eastern enlargement as well as on a multilateral basis with-
in the GATT/WTO. The contribution of this approach of tying one's own hands to stabili-
zing expectations should be enhanced by the EU by offering CEECs stable conditions for
market access.
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A. Introduction
One of the most spectacular developments in
post-war international economic relations has
been the emergence of East and Southeast Asian
economies (ESAEs) on world markets for manu-
factured goods. Starting from a narrow supply
base of primary commodities and few semi-
processed manufactures, the region has become
the host of most competitive producers of a wide
range of medium-tech goods within less than
thirty years. While its share in total world trade
(including primary commodities) almost tripled
from 6.1 per cent in 1965 to 16 per cent in 1992
(including the far less dynamic South Asian
countries), the true highlight was the un-
precedented expansion of its share in the world
market of manufacture from 3.6 per cent to 17.6
per cent. Rapid per capita income growth in the
1970s and 1980s (with about 6 per cent p.a.
twice as high as the world average) would not
have been sustainable if ESAEs had simply
enlarged and defended traditional markets of
well-established industries. Rather, permanent
quality upgrading of old products, designing new
products, penetrating new export markets, and
exploiting opportunities for cost-effective
sourcing of inputs have been required for living
standards to improve.
Structural flexibility, both sectorally and
regionally, seems to have been a major driving
force behind sustainable export expansion in
ESAEs. Sectoral changes in export supply have
been indispensable for higher income economies
whose export markets have been contested by
lower income economies catching up from the
same region. As a result, there has been a
"cascading" effect of shifting production of
standardized products from upper to lower in-
come economies, parallel to the well-known
"flying geese" pattern observed in Japanese in-
vestment flows within Asia. For example, the
share of clothing and textiles in total exports of
the four NIEs (Hong Kong, Rep. of Korea,
Singapore and Taiwan) declined from 24 per
cent in 1980 to 17 per cent in 1992 while the
share of machinery and transport equipment rose
from 22 per cent to 43 per cent (Figure 1). At
the same time, the second generation of success-
ful exporters (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand) increased the share of clothing and
textiles in their total exports from 9 to 26 per
cent; also the latter industry gained in
importance — but its share remained lower than
in the NIEs (5 and 24 per cent in 1980 and
1992, respectively). Putting the exports of the
two country groups together, three quarters of
textile and clothing exports originated from the
NIEs in 1980 and only one quarter from the
second-generation exporters. This distribution
changed substantially until 1992 when the
groups were almost at equal footing (51 to 49
per cent). For machinery and transport equip-
ment, only 16 per cent of combined exports
came from the second-generation exporters in
1980. In this industry, too, progress was made in
catching up vis-a-vis the NIEs: second-
generation exporters accounted for 27 per cent
of total Asian machinery exports in 1992.
One of the major factors accelerating such
changes during the last decade has been the
emergence of China on world markets. EU trade
with ESAEs bears witness to this point. For
instance, Taiwan accounted for the largest in-
dividual country share in EU footwear imports
from non-OECD sources in 1986 (18 per cent
compared with China with only 4 per cent), but
stepped down to 7 per cent in 1992 and lost its
top rank to China (achieving 19 per cent in
1992). Yet, Taiwanese export growth did not
lose momentum as the economy successfully
concentrated on more income-elastic machinery
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aThe NIEs include Hong Kong, Rep. of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. —
Malaysia, and Thailand.
Source: GAIT International Trade (various issues).
Regional diversification has involved a shift
from traditional markets, notably the US, to
Europe and, subsequently, to neighbouring
Asian countries. In fact, trade among ESAEs
has received the largest impulse recently, and
climbed to levels close to intra-NAFTA trade
(about 40 per cent of total trade). By 1992,
ESAEs bypassed the US as Japan's most im-
portant export market.
Asian trade dynamics have often been as-
sociated with export-oriented or export-driven
growth. However, economic growth is triggered
by allocating resources to investment rather than
consumption in the first place. This does not
necessarily imply that export demand is
favoured over domestic demand. Export pro-
motion measures would have discriminated
against domestic demand only if they had over-
compensated explicit export taxes, implicit taxes
resulting from import protection, and a policy-
induced overvaluation of real exchange rates.
Analyzing the impact of such policy measures
on Asian export success deserves special at-
tention in this study.
Apart from explicit export promotion policies,
the role of macroeconomic conditions and
regional impulses received from neighbouring
countries are discussed in Chapter B. Sub-
sequently, the starting conditions of ESAEs are
countries of the second generation include China, Indonesia,
contrasted with those of Central and East Euro-
pean countries (CEECs). In Chapter C, it is also
assessed whether low transaction costs because
of geographical proximity of CEECs to the EU
help to overcome competitive disadvantages.
Such disadvantages might arise if CEECs' ex-
ports to the EU have to compete with similar
products exported by well-established suppliers
from ESAEs. In this context, so-called trade
overlap estimates are presented. Yet, even low
overlaps and geographical proximity might be
ineffective to spur CEECs' exports if supply-
side constraints are still binding. This is why
policy conditions in CEECs are given due at-
tention in Chapter C. Finally, Chapter D pro-
vides conclusions on promising export strategies
for transition economies considering both the
Asian experience and the specific conditions
prevailing in CEECs. The focus is on internal
policy requirements, since the most generous
conditions for access to export markets will be
of little help if exports are effectively hampered
by domestic policies in the CEECs themselves.
Provided that domestic policies set appropriate
incentives for exports, the EU and other export
markets have to be absorptive and accessible.
Hence, it is also discussed in which way the EU
may enhance the export prospects of CEECs.B. Contributing Factors to Asian Export Success
I. The Role of Export Promotion
Policies in Asia
1. Country Experiences
ESAEs have often been labelled as a homo-
geneous group of export-oriented economies.
Yet, this label obscures considerable conceptual
controversy on the true meaning of "openness"
or "export-orientation" (Learner 1988; Edwards
1989). as well as a large variance in starting
conditions, policy sequences and timing of trade-
related measures among ESAEs. Export pro-
motion measures seem to have played an im-
portant role in offsetting export disincentives
which result from import-substitution policies
and their implicit taxation of exports. Beyond
this offsetting function, it has remained con-
troversial whether export promotion measures
provided net incentives for exports and, thus,
discriminated against production for domestic
markets. Frequent changes in export promotion
measures and varying levels of import protection
on the one hand, and retaliatory measures of
trading partners on the other hand render it
rather unlikely that net export incentives have
lasted for longer periods.
It is virtually impossible to convert various
export promotion measures into a common
numeraire (e.g., an exchange rate equivalent) in
order to make them comparable across coun-
tries. Hence, it is more helpful to discuss export
promotion measures taken by individual ESAEs
and to analyze the relevance of specific
measures across countries. Furthermore, it is
necessary to discuss such measures in the con-
text of the entire trade policy of ESAEs. In
many cases, export promoting effects had arisen
primarily from the dismantling of import pro-
tection, and direct export promotion had a sup-
porting function only.
a. Hong Kong
Given its small size and lack of natural re-
sources, Hong Kong adopted outward-oriented
policies from the very beginning.
1 Now it is the
world's eighth largest trader with a share of 3.7
per cent in global exports.
Hong Kong is one of the most open economies
in the world. Its trading regime is marked by the
absence of any kind of import protection. It has
no tariff or non-tariff restrictions on imports
from any source. Whatever controls do exist, are
maintained on technical, environmental, health
or security grounds.
Exporters are not given subsidies, con-
cessionary financing or tax exemptions. Hong
Kong does not operate any state-trading enter-
prises. It has no foreign exchange controls. A
minimal governmental assistance is available in
the form of trade information and participation
in trade fairs. Hong Kong presents an exemplary
case of a successful open and market-driven
economy.
b. Indonesia
Traditionally, the Indonesian economy has been
heavily dependent on exploiting oil and gas re-
sources.
2 During the 1960s and 1970s, Indo-
nesia tried to diversify its economic structure
through import-substitution policy, but achieved
only limited success. In the 1980s, it shifted the
policy emphasis to export promotion. The fol-
lowing were the major steps in this direction.
The Indonesian currency was devalued by 28
per cent in March 1983, followed by another de-
valuation by 31 per cent in September 1986.
Since then shock devaluations have been
avoided.
3 The currency has been allowed to de-
preciate under a managed floating system, based
on a basket of currencies from major trading
partners. The Indonesian exchange rate policy is
targeted at stabilizing the real value of the cur-
rency to maintain competitiveness of exports and
develop new export markets. Confidence in the
currency has been enhanced by tight monetary
policies and positive real interest rates. This
policy has helped to stimulate investment into
export production of manufactures and to reduce
the current account deficit.
Liberalization of imports has been achieved
through reducing the number of tariff lines sub-ject to import licensing, replacing non-tariff
barriers by price-related measures, and lowering
tariffs. Reform packages introduced from time
to time have reduced the protection level in In-
donesia. Some of the industries which are
viewed as strategic (e.g., shipbuilding, steel,
aerospace, cement, fertilizers) and are dominated
by state-trading companies, as well as a major
part of agriculture continue to be shielded from
import competition. On the whole, however, In-
donesia's import liberalization has gradually ex-
posed domestic producers to increased foreign
competition and, thus, indirectly stimulated non-
traditional exports.
Export policy has generally aimed at pro-
moting non-fuel exports that had suffered from
oil-price-induced real appreciation from time to
time (dutch disease syndrome). Exporters have
been granted excise duty and VAT exemptions
as well as refunds on imported inputs. Pro-
visions have been made to by-pass import licens-
ing restrictions. Exports of natural resources
such as logs and rattan are restricted in order to
encourage domestic processing and exports of
finished goods.
Direct assistance to exporters is extended
through technical assistance in overseas mar-
keting and promotion (participation in trade
fairs, selling missions, trade promotion centres)
as well as production management. Priority is
given to goods with a local content of raw ma-
terials, high labour intensity and domestic mul-
tiplier effects. Cheap export financing was cur-
tailed following Indonesia's signing of the
GATT Code on Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties in 1985. Export credits are now provided
by commercial banks basically on commercial
terms. Guarantee and insurance of export credits
are provided by the government. In order to im-
prove the reputation of Indonesian exports, the
government specifies minimum standards for an
increasing number of goods. Standards applied
are not more stringent than internationally ap-
plicable.
The government has established special
bonded zones, where imports of goods reex-
ported after processing and warehousing are
duty-free. Light manufacturing factories work-
ing for exports, e.g., in electronics, semi-con-
ductors, garments and food processing are al-
lowed to locate in these zones.
Rules on foreign direct investment (FDI) have
been liberalized especially in export-oriented
manufacturing. Investment and local ownership
requirements were virtually dropped in 1994 to
encourage FDI which has been instrumental in
boosting Indonesia's export capacity, especially
in manufacturing. Only in the case of wholly
foreign-owned companies a certain share of for-
eign ownership has to be sold within 15 years.
Trade reforms and liberalization programmes
are reported (Pangestu 1992) to have been in-
sufficient to completely remove the anti-export
bias of government policies, including the nega-
tive consequences of the dutch-disease syn-
drome. Nevertheless, reforms have supported
changes in the sectoral composition of exports
towards manufactures. Furthermore, the growth
of manufactured exports appears to be in accor-
dance with changes in Indonesia's comparative
advantages. FDI inflows have increased con-
siderably and have become more export-oriented
after the shift in the trade policy regime.
c. Malaysia
Malaysia is a prime example of a country which
has been able to evolve from a commodity-based
to a diversified economy.
4 In a little more than
three decades after its independence, the share of
manufacturing in GDP increased by six times to
nearly 30 per cent in the early 1990s. The manu-
facturing sector now accounts for 70 per cent of
exports, whereas rubber and tin were the main
foreign exchange earners in the 1960s (70 per
cent of exports). A significant part of this suc-
cess is due to Malaysia's shift from import-sub-
stitution policies in the 1960s and 1970s to ex-
port-oriented manufacturing in the 1980s.
The policy shift included the liberalization of
international financial transactions. Financial
transfers related to current transactions are free
from restrictions. The exchange rate regime may
be described as managed floating, with the cen-
tral bank intervening in terms of a composite
basket of currencies to maintain "orderly con-
ditions". The real effective exchange rate of the
Malaysian currency depreciated by about 22 per
cent between 1980 and 1992. Empirical studiesreveal that exporters responded considerably to
real exchange rate movements during the 1980s
(Beng 1992: 203).
Malaysia has steadily lowered the effective
rate of protection (ERP) to force local producers
to become internationally competitive. The aver-
age ERP declined from 45 per cent in 1969 to
31 per cent in 1979 and to 17 per cent in 1987.
Protection is given because of infant and stra-
tegic industry arguments to a small number of
industries (e.g., motor vehicles, chassis with en-
gines, tractors, basic steel products, etc.), but
only on a temporary basis. In most of the cases
where import licences are required, conditions
are attached on health, moral or security
grounds.
Free commercial zones for trading companies
and free industrial zones for manufacturing
companies have been established to promote im-
ports and exports of goods and services. Busi-
nesses in these zones are exempted from cus-
toms duties, excise duties, sales tax and service
tax in so far as their products are exported.
Other export promotion measures include the
following: Exporters are eligible for a deduction
from taxable income of twice the amount of
relevant business expenditure and receive pre-
miums on export credit insurance to encourage
penetration of non-traditional markets. Exemp-
tions from import and excise duties on raw
materials and components used for export manu-
facturing are generally available in Malaysia.
Export financing facilities cover almost all
manufactures with a given minimum local con-
tent, and extend over four months for the pre-
shipment period and six months for the post-
shipment period.
In 1993, the Malaysia External Trade Devel-
opment Corporation (MATRADE) was estab-
lished to provide exporters with an expanded
and intensified range of assistance including
market research, product development and
training in marketing. MATRADE is expected
to promote the image of Malaysia as a high-
quality exporting country having a good busi-
ness ethic. There are other institutional facilities
available for exporters wanting to establish
representation and distribution centres abroad or
taking part in trade fairs. These facilities are of
great help especially to smaller exporters and
newcomers.
Malaysia has traditionally given several fiscal
and financial incentives to foreign direct in-
vestors, especially in manufacturing industries
devoted to exports. Some of them were scaled
down in the early 1990s, but the government can
grant more favourable support on a case-by-case
basis. The present focus is on high technology,
domestic value added, expanded domestic link-
ages, environmental protection and greater ex-
port capabilities. Malaysia has become an at-
tractive location for FDI. Since 1987, 60 per
cent of current manufacturing investment has
been based on overseas capital, largely directed
to export-oriented industries. The role of specific
incentives, relative to the general policy frame-
work, in explaining the inflow of FDI is open to
debate, however.
d. Republic of Korea
In approximately three decades, Korea has been
able to transform its agrarian structure into an
industrialized economy.
5 This was, however, not
a very smooth process. The country had to ad-
just its industrial and trade policies several
times. During 1962-1971, Korea implemented
an outward-oriented development strategy. It
opted for promoting labour-intensive manufac-
turing exports in which it had comparative ad-
vantages. For this purpose, the exchange rate
was devalued by nearly 100 per cent to eliminate
the earlier bias against exports. Short-term ex-
port financing and tariff rebates on imported in-
puts for exports were made available. There was
a general shift towards import liberalization and
more competition on domestic factor and goods
markets. Korean export growth turned out to be
very high (33 per cent per annum in real terms)
during this period. Then, however, the Korean
government got concerned about the vulner-
ability of its labour-intensive manufactures on
international markets due to arising protec-
tionism in industrially advanced countries. The
industrial strategy was shifted towards the de-
velopment of heavy industries, which included
iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding,
automobiles, machinery, petrochemicals, and
electronics.In order to promote these industries, the gov-
ernment raised tariffs and quantitative restric-
tions on imports of competing goods in 1973 and
1976. Moreover, the exchange rate was fixed at
a relatively low rate to avoid higher costs for
imported equipment for these industries. Thus,
the years between 1972 and 1978 can be re-
garded as a period of policy reversal towards
import substitution. This policy drive was effec-
tive in the sense that the share of heavy indus-
tries (including chemicals) in all manufacturing
fixed investment and total exports increased
markedly. But it had some serious negative con-
sequences and could not be sustained. Credit ex-
pansion in favour of heavy industries led to in-
flation. Relative prices were distorted by world-
market standards. International competitiveness
suffered badly, since the exchange rate was not
allowed to adjust. Export growth became nega-
tive in real terms, and the growth of GNP de-
celerated. As a result, the Korean economic
policy was overhauled in 1979.
The measures adopted since 1979 have aimed
at stronger reliance on market mechanisms and
private initiative, slower growth of money sup-
ply, realignment of credit priorities in favour of
light industries, import liberalization and de-
control of many commodity prices. In January
1980, the Korean currency was devalued and a
more flexible exchange rate regime was intro-
duced. Furthermore, FDI was liberalized suc-
cessively. Technology import was freed from
prior government approval. Industry-specific in-
centives were replaced with general incentives
available to all industries. By the mid-1980s, the
success of these measures was noticeable in
terms of export growth, FDI inflows and a more
equitable income distribution. This seems to
have contributed to a slowing down of the
dynamism of reforms since then.
The main features of current trade policies in
Korea are as follows:
- The country has operated a system of managed
floating against the US dollar since 1990. Major
realignments have not been made since the early
1980s.
- Several tariff reforms have reduced the aver-
age tariff on industrial goods to less than 10 per
cent. Virtually all tariffs are applied on an ad-
valorem basis. There are no variable levies.
However, Korea tries to influence the sourcing
of its imports through officially guided diver-
sification and so-called localization pro-
grammes. Import liberalization extends to al-
most all manufactured items (exceptions refer to
some textiles and leather garments).
- Direct export subsidies are not given any more
after retaliatory measures of trading partners
through countervailing duties and anti-dumping
procedures in the past. Some indirect subsidi-
zation of exports may still result from prefer-
ential access to export credits and export-related
tax-free reserves.
- Drawbacks on tariffs and indirect internal
taxes are allowed on all imported inputs used in
export production.
- Insurance on all exports and overseas con-
struction contracts are available from a publicly
managed insurance agency. Its deficits, if any,
are covered by the government budget.
- A rather comprehensive institutional set-up
promotes exports through lowering costs of in-
formation. The major role is played by the
Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA),
which has an international network encom-
passing nearly 70 countries. Its activities include
collecting and distributing market information,
finding customers for Korean products, assisting
in product design and packaging, advertising
Korean products abroad and participation in in-
ternational trade fairs.
- There are two free-trade zones accounting for
less than 3 per cent of Korea's exports and im-
ports in 1990. Likewise, their share in total FDI
inflows has been marginal.
- Several funds (Industrial Development Fund,
National Investment Fund, Structural Adjust-
ment Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises,
Research and Development Fund) support en-
terprises in various ways, some of which are
directed explicitly towards improving export
competitiveness.
- FDI has been liberalized considerably. Almost
all manufacturing industries are open for foreign
direct investors. Tax and tariff privileges are
given on investments coupled with advanced
technologies.Overall, the Korean experience illustrates an
interesting aspect of timing. Direct export pro-
motion was initiated before import liberalization
had taken place, in order to relax balance-of-
payments constraints in a period of declining
foreign assistance. Arguably, immediate import
liberalization would have faced the risk of
further balance-of-payments deterioration. After
export promotion had contributed to an im-
proved balance-of-payments situation, import
liberalization was considered sustainable. It then
became the major impulse of sustained export
growth. At the same time, direct export pro-
motion measures substantially lost in impor-
tance.
e. Singapore
Before independence in 1959, the economy of
the island city state of Singapore was dominated
by entrepot trade.
6 In the early 1960s, the focus
was placed on industrial development involving
labour-intensive industries producing mainly for
export markets. This strategy was successful in
yielding real GDP growth of about 10 per cent
per annum in 1965-1980, and raising the share
of manufactures in GDP from 15 to nearly 30
per cent. The emphasis shifted to skill- and tech-
nology-intensive sectors (including services) in
the 1980s, again targeting at export markets.
Export expansion was required to ensure the
financing of the high import ratio that charac-
terizes Singapore. It has, therefore, adopted an
open trading regime from the very beginning.
The total value of its exports and imports cur-
rently amounts to more than three times its
GDP. The major features of Singapore's trade
policy are summarized in the following.
Singapore has no foreign exchange controls
since 1978. The external value of the currency is
monitored against a trade-weighted basket of
foreign currencies. The nominal effective ex-
change rate of the Singapore dollar was marked
by a rising trend during the 1980s. Trade liber-
alization proceeded in two stages: (i) replace-
ment of quotas with tariffs in the late 1960s, and
(ii) total removal of quotas and tariff reduction
in the early 1970s. Hence, Singapore liberalized
its trading regime substantially within six years.
Protection of domestic industries through
tariff or non-tariff barriers is largely absent to-
day. Some non-tariff measures and import duties
levied on alcohol, tobacco, fuel, vehicles, etc.
are for health, social or environmental reasons.
Textiles and clothing account for almost 80 per
cent of the tariff lines bearing ad-valorem rates
(most of which are at 5 per cent). Because of the
high proportion of duty-free trade, the average
tariff rate is below 1 per cent. It is thus not sur-
prising that duty drawbacks for inputs used in
export production are not frequently claimed.
In the context of the Uruguay Round (UR),
Singapore raised the percentage of imports sub-
ject to bound rates from zero to 73 per cent.
However, it did not guarantee duty-free treat-
ment legally. Hence, duty-free treatment is still
based on applied rather than bound rates.
Direct export subsidies are not provided in
Singapore. As far as export financing is con-
cerned, rediscounting of export bills is possible
through the exporter's bank. Export credit guar-
antees and insurance are available through
commercial banks and other non-governmental
financial institutions at market rates.
Much of Singapore's transit trade takes place
in six free-trade zones, which provide a range of
facilities and services for storage and reexport of
goods. Industries are not located in these zones,
however.
Institutionally, exports are promoted by the
Singapore Trade Development Board (TDB),
which was set up in 1983. Its aims include the
identification of new markets and attracting in-
ternational trading activities to Singapore.
Furthermore, TDB provides financial assistance
to private companies for setting up overseas of-
fices, improving product quality, marketing new
products and services, and for participating in
trade fairs and exhibitions. Financial assistance
is given also for bidding for overseas contracts.
FDI is of central importance to the economy
of Singapore. Its share in gross fixed capital
formation is higher than in any other country of
the world (except for Papua New Guinea in
1991 and 1992) (see UNCTAD 1994b: 421-
426). Persistently high FDI inflows are to be at-
tributed to the favourable macroeconomic and
political investment climate, rather than to the10
preferential treatment of foreign investors. No
distinction is made between local and foreign
companies with regard to investment incentives,
which are given according to priorities of the
general development strategy of the government.
Since the 1980s, these priorities have been en-
joyed mostly by industries requiring relatively
few natural resources and using skilled labour.
Local and foreign companies are eligible for
double deduction from income of their expenses
incurred on export promotion such as partici-
pation in trade fairs and maintenance of overseas
trade offices.
Free trade and market-oriented policies have
enabled Singapore to enjoy strong export and
GDP growth since the 1960s. What distin-
guishes Singapore from other ESAEs, notably
Korea, is that efforts at promoting exports took
place simultaneously with import liberalization.
Immediate import liberalization was feasible in
Singapore because of the strong initial balance-
of-payments position, the stability of the cur-
rency, the flexibility of domestic exporters in re-
sponding to the new competitive environment,
and efficient factor markets.
/. The Philippines
The Philippine economy has been the "slow-
goer" among the ESAEs considered here.
7
Average GDP and export growth rates have
been lower than in other ASEAN countries in
the last three decades. The country has suffered
from chronic shortages of foreign exchange, and
has often been faced with balance-of-payments
crises. Most of these problems can be attributed
to domestic economic policies. Import substi-
tution was maintained during the 1950s and
1960s. It was only later in the 1970s that vari-
ous export incentives were introduced, including
the establishment of export processing zones.
This resulted in a rapid growth of export items
produced in these enclaves, particularly of tex-
tiles and electrical components. In 1981, a pro-
gramme for the development of heavy industries
was launched. Most of the 11 projects intro-
duced under this programme proved to be a fail-
ure, and the priority of industrial strategy was
shifted to agrobusiness and labour-intensive,
small and medium-scale industries. Since 1987,
a greater emphasis has been laid on deregu-
lation, privatization and liberalization of trade.
The real effective exchange rate of the
Philippine peso has been subject to fluctuations.
Major depreciations in 1983 (17 per cent) and
1986 (20 per cent) resulted in substantial in-
creases in exports. The subsequent appreciation
of the peso during 1986-1990 seems to have
been responsible for the decline in export
growth. While significant foreign exchange con-
trols have been removed since 1992, the Central
Bank has continued to intervene in the foreign
exchange market to maintain "orderly con-
ditions".
The nominal (unweighted) average tariff has
been halved since 1980, and quantitative restric-
tions have been removed on about 95 per cent of
import items. However, considerable tariff esca-
lation in manufacturing has persisted. On an
average, tariffs range between 10.7 per cent for
raw materials and 26.5 per cent for processed
goods. Escalation is lower in agriculture, but the
corresponding tariff rates are much higher (38.1
per cent for raw materials and 43.6 per cent for
processed goods). In addition to dismantling
quantitative restrictions unilaterally, the Philip-
pines have lowered implicit taxes on exports by
further tariff cuts under the UR and by binding
tariffs for more than 60 per cent of dutiable im-
ports.
Similar to other developing countries, the
Philippines have attempted to reduce the anti-
export bias inherent in import restrictions
through duty exemptions and drawbacks. How-
ever, their bureaucratic costs are high because
only about 20 per cent of all exporters and half
of non-traditional exporters have made use of
the exemptions or drawbacks. The recent crea-
tion of the One-Stop Action and Information
Centre may have reduced bureaucratic hurdles.
Four export processing zones and ten special
industrial zones offer infrastructural facilities as
well as tax and duty exemptions for imported
raw materials and intermediate inputs used in
processing, assembling and manufacturing of
goods for export. The relative importance of ex-
ports originating from these zones increased
during the 1980s, but remained below 10 per
cent of total Philippine exports.11
Export financing has been available through a
variety of schemes (e.g., export packaging
credits, export bill credits, foreign currency
loans of the Central Bank, and loans from the
Philippine International Trading Corporation).
Financing has generally been at terms prevailing
on international capital markets. Some subsidy
element may be involved in credits given to
small and medium-size exporters by the Philip-
pine International Trading Corporation. The
proportion of exports financed by all these
schemes has been very low, however, at least
partly because of collateral requirements. The
scheme to provide a collateral substitute by the
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation has not worked well due to its own
financial problems.
Export promotion activities supported by the
government include participation in international
trade fairs, exhibitions, and selling missions, as
well as training to improve management in the
export sector. More efforts are being made to
improve the institutional framework of export
promotion.
As concerns FDI in the Philippines, the For-
eign Investment Act of 1991 expanded the num-
ber of economic sectors open to 100 per cent
foreign ownership, streamlined the approval
process, and clearly defined the remaining limits
and restrictions. With regard to tax and fiscal
incentives, foreign firms have largely been
treated at par with local firms. A distinguishing
feature as compared to other ESAEs is that the
Philippines have used debt-equity swaps to at-
tract foreign enterprises. Reportedly, swaps have
contributed significantly to the increase of FDI.
In summary, earlier attempts at direct export
promotion in the Philippines were concentrated
on free economic zones, bonded warehouses and
other enclave activities. They left import sub-
stitution activities basically untouched. As a re-
sult, only few local inputs (including cheap la-
bour) were tapped. Demand for inputs produced
by the import-substituting sector and hence
competition with this sector were minimal. Ex-
port promotion remained isolated and was not
supported by significant import liberalization.
Moreover, the effects of export promotion re-
mained limited since the macroeconomic en-
vironment was flawed with volatility and lack of
discipline. The Philippine economy is still lag-
ging behind its competitors in the Asian region.
However, trade promotion policies have made a
definite headway more recently. The share of
manufactured exports in total exports increased
from 53 per cent in 1985 to 71 per cent in 1991.
During 1986-1990, imports of liberalized goods
increased by 20 per cent per annum without
threatening seriously the existence of firms in
most industries. Finally, monetary and fiscal
discipline during recent years has provided a
more supportive environment for trade reform
than in the early 1980s.
8- Thailand
Like many other developing countries, Thailand
started with an import-substitution strategy to
transform its agriculture-dominated economic
structure.
8 Realizing the limits of this strategy, it
shifted the policy focus towards export-oriented
industries in the mid-1970s. Thailand has
witnessed significant trade liberalization since
then, although several sectors such as agro-
processing, textiles, leather products and motor
vehicles still remain overproportionally pro-
tected. The country's exports and GDP have
grown fast by worldwide standards. In order to
maintain this momentum, more industries are
likely to be opened to international competition.
The Thai currency has fluctuated in relation
to a basket of currencies since 1984. The US
dollar is used as the intervention currency. For-
eign exchange regulations were substantially lib-
eralized in May 1990. For the 1980s as a whole,
the real effective exchange rate of the Thai cur-
rency depreciated by nearly one fifth, which con-
tributed to the economy's competitiveness on
world export markets. In spite of depreciation,
the high demand for foreign inputs caused im-
ports to increase more rapidly than exports. The
resulting balance-of-payments deficit was more
than compensated by foreign capital inflows in
response to improved cost competitiveness of the
Thai economy.
The Thai budget is more dependent on trade
taxes than in other ESAEs. This has led to re-
curring changes in tariffs. Compared with the
early 1960s, the average applied tariff declined12
from about 24 to 17 per cent in the second half
of the 1980s. As in many other developing coun-
tries, bound rates have remained higher. The
trade weighted average of bound rates on in-
dustrial products was reduced from 37 per cent
in the pre-UR period to 28 per cent thereafter.
The implicit tax on exports resulting from
remaining import protection (notably tariff esca-
lation, non-automatic licensing, local content
schemes and government procurement policies)
has been reduced through the remission of or ex-
emption from tariffs, other import levies and in-
come taxes. In addition, there are investment
promotion zones, industrial estates, and export
processing zones, where exporters are not sub-
ject to bureaucratic procedures in claiming tax
rebates, etc., and benefit from favourable infra-
structure. Export firms can bypass many
customs procedures through bonded manufac-
turing warehouses, the geographical location of
which is not restricted in Thailand.
Exporters have access to concessional export
financing. Long-term export financing was
started in 1985 with the help of the Japanese
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund; short-
term financing is provided by the Bank of Thai-
land through commercial banks. Quantitative
estimates of indirect export subsidization re-
sulting from concessional export credits are not
available, however.
A variety of incentives are available to foreign
investors in addition to those given to domestic
investors as well. They include guarantees
against nationalization, competition from new
state enterprises, and price controls. Some im-
port protection is also given as tax-exempted
imports of competing products are not allowed.
The employment of skilled foreign personnel in
foreign enterprises is not restricted. Favourable
macroeconomic conditions supported a high
growth of FDI, increasing its share in gross
fixed capital formation from 3.2 per cent (1981-
1985) to 5.6 per cent (1991) (see UNCTAD
1994b: 425). Japan has been the main source of
FDI in Thailand. The structure of Japanese in-
vestment has shifted from import-substituting
consumer goods industries to export-oriented
sectors such as electrical and electronic products
and textiles. Both the growth and sectoral allo-
cation of FDI imply favourable effects on Thai-
land's trade performance.
The legal framework of trade and FDI in-
centives in Thailand seems to manifest a higher
degree of public management than in other
ESAEs considered so far. Yet, a stable monetary
environment has been sustained and flexible ad-
justment to changing world-market conditions
has been encouraged rather than prevented by
the government. Thailand's success in changing
the export mix is documented by the rise of the
share of manufactured goods in exports from
less than one fifth to two thirds within two
decades.
h. Taiwan
Taiwan, one of the fastest growing countries of
the world, was highly concerned with the short-
age of foreign exchange in the 1950s.
9 It
launched a two-pronged strategy of import sub-
stitution and export promotion. The country
raised its world export share from 0.1 per cent in
the 1960s to 2.2 per cent in 1992, and has ac-
cumulated the highest amount of foreign ex-
change reserves in the world (UNCTAD 1994a:
334). Nine tenths of its exports in the 1950s
consisted of agricultural goods. This position is
now occupied by industrial products. All this
has made Taiwan as the most often quoted ex-
ample of successful export promotion.
The first stage of import substitution in the
1950s was targeted at labour-intensive consumer
durables such as textiles, clothing, bicycles,
wood and leather products. The government
promoted the domestic production of these so-
called light manufactures through low interest
loans, tax reliefs, high tariffs and quantitative
restrictions on imports, as well as overvalued
multiple exchange rates. Import controls were
the most important measure. In the 1970s, im-
port substitution was shifted to intermediate
products and capital goods. Nearly the same
measures as in the 1950s were applied, but the
emphasis was placed on tariffs rather than
quantitative import restrictions in this second
stage. Furthermore, the government established
public enterprises in industries such as iron and
steel, shipbuilding and petrochemicals. Sub-
sequently, import controls have been removed13
almost on all items except those related to agri-
culture, automobile production and military. In
the wake of liberalization, import tariffs have
also been reduced drastically. Average nominal
tariffs declined from 56 per cent in 1972 to 5 per
cent in 1992, which qualifies Taiwan to enter the
WTO as an industrial economy rather than a de-
veloping economy seeking for special and differ-
ential treatment. Few industrial products such as
automobiles still face relatively high tariffs.
Exports have been encouraged through duty
and tax rebates since the early 1950s. However,
the real push was given in 1957-58 when ca-
pacity utilization in many industries fell to very
low levels, and the limits of absorptive capacity
of domestic markets became quite conspicuous.
A variety of export promotion measures were
introduced. They were made available for all
industries allowing entrepreneurs to develop
their own export strategies. The multiple ex-
change rate system was replaced by a unified
rate, which implied a heavy dose of currency de-
valuation. The effective devaluation amounted to
60 per cent for exporters. Further measures in-
cluded the removal of quantitative restrictions on
intermediate and capital goods imported by ex-
porters; the simplification of procedures for the
rebate of import duties, commodity and other
taxes; and a broad package of fiscal incentives,
subsidies, marketing support, cheap credits and
export insurance. In 1965, foreign investors
were granted a five-year corporate income tax
holiday and a maximum tax of 25 per cent
thereafter. Moreover, they enjoyed a duty and
tax-free trade regime. Export production was
further encouraged through export processing
zones (EPZs), bonded factories and warehouses.
During 1971-1980, EPZs accounted for three
quarters of Taiwan's trade surplus. In the
1980s, this share declined sharply because of
general trade liberalization and the introduction
of bonded factories which could be established
anywhere on the island.
Export policies in Taiwan, involving direct
promotion and indirect support through import
liberalization, have been highly successful. Ex-
ports as well as FDI have increased strongly.
FDI grew from a negligible level in the 1950s to
11 per cent of gross capital formation in 1971;
by the mid-1970s, foreign enterprises accounted
for 80 per cent of exports of electronics and
electrical appliances.
Trade policy of Taiwan continued its liber-
alisation course during the 1980s. At the same
time, high export growth, rising foreign ex-
change reserves and the resistance of trading
partners motivated the government to slash the
promotional export assistance. The subsidy
element on export credits was reduced from 3-5
percentage points of interest rates in the 1970s
to 1-2 percentage points in the 1980s. Tariff re-
bates and tax concessions declined substantially.
In 1989, they amounted to only 7 per cent of
total tariff and corporate tax collection as com-
pared with 23 per cent in 1980. In April 1989,
the international movement of money and capital
was freed from foreign exchange controls. The
exchange rate was allowed to be determined by
market forces. Since then it has stabilized stop-
ping the earlier tendency of appreciation.
Remarkable about the success of Taiwanese
trade policies is that it has been achieved al-
though manufactured exports have not received
preferential treatment in important OECD mar-
kets. Unlike all other ESAEs, Taiwan has not
been recognized as a G-77 member. Economi-
cally, preferential treatment is equivalent to an
export subsidy financed by the government of
the importing country, which foregoes tariff
revenues, and by non-beneficiaries losing market
shares. Taiwan belonging to the latter, it had to
rely on its own policies. The financial burden of
export promotion has been eased by high
domestic savings and budgetary discipline.
With the emergence of the P.R. of China,
competitive pressure on Taiwanese exports has
intensified. Producers have been forced to up-
grade the product mix, to lower costs and to out-
locate production. The latter response to com-
petitive pressure has made Taiwan a net ex-
porter of FDI, with many firms locating pro-
duction facilities particularly in mainland China
in order to benefit from lower costs of pro-
duction.14
2. The Effectiveness of Export Promotion
Instruments
The preceding review of different approaches to
export promotion in ESAEs provides insights as
to the effectiveness of policy instruments. The
basic lesson from ESAEs is that macroeconomic
stability and private sector confidence in future
investment conditions are of great importance
for the success of export promotion pro-
grammes. Export promotion is likely to remain
futile, for example, if excessive volatility of real
exchange rates prevails and the current account
situation appears to be unsustainable. Likewise,
chronic government deficits and monetary
management running out of control will erode
the effectiveness of export promotion. Under
such conditions, domestic financing of capital
formation in export industries will be deficient
and FDI will be discouraged. Hence, specific
export incentives should not be considered to be
an alternative to sound macroeconomic policies.
Moreover, the evidence from ESAEs suggests
that exporters should have unrestricted access to
domestic and imported inputs. The success of
export promotion further depends on the avail-
ability of essential infrastructure (transport,
telecommunications, power supply, ports) and
an efficient legal system to guarantee the en-
forcement of contracts (Rajapatirana 1993).
There is another lesson to be drawn from the ex-
perience of ESAEs: In spite of an active par-
ticipation of governments in the allocation of re-
sources in most of these countries, they have left
enough room for private initiative and the mar-
ket mechanism (World Bank 1993). Investors
have been forced to improve productivity and to
produce under world market conditions. Struc-
tural change has been accelerated rather than
impeded.
a. Direct Subsidies
Subsidies are normally given as tax exemptions.
Cash grants on exports are very rare. Tax ex-
emptions can be based on profits, sales, value
added, investments or expenses related to over-
seas marketing, etc. Profit-based income tax ex-
emptions have been used, e.g., in Korea and
Singapore, and are easy to implement. Sales-
based tax allowance has been applied in
Malaysia. The Philippines have granted income
tax credit on local value added. Some countries
have used several forms of export subsidization
(Rhee 1984). Since subsidies are usually granted
together with other export promotion measures,
it is difficult to ascertain their contribution to
export expansion (Rajapatirana 1993:14).
ESAEs have reduced direct subsidies gradu-
ally. Favourable export performance have made
subsidies more and more redundant. Moreover,
international pressure has induced the phasing
out of direct subsidies. Still remaining subsidies
have to be abolished within a period of five to
eight years starting from January 1995, as the
new WTO rules prohibit direct subsidies in the
form of transfers of funds or foregone revenues.
This applies to economies in transition as well if
they are members of WTO. The phasing out
period for them is seven years in the case of
subsidies based on export performance, and
eight years for those related to local value added.
Thus, direct subsidies are no more relevant as an
export promotion measure, except for "least de-
veloped" countries which are exempted from the
prohibition of subsidies related to export per-
formance. As concerns subsidies related to local
content, even "least developed" countries are not
allowed to grant them for more than eight years
after the new agreement becomes effective
(UNCTAD 1995).
b. Credit Subsidies
Most ESAEs have established credit facilities
for exporters. They range from short-term pre-
and post-shipment credits (Malaysia) to long-
term investment loans. Credits are given at mar-
ket rates, e.g., in Singapore and the Philippines.
In other cases, the subsidy element was reduced
considerably during the 1980s (Indonesia and
Taiwan). Asian governments considered the
provision of export credits to be necessary in
order to reduce the bias against exports, and to
compensate for a loss of competitiveness vis-a-
vis other countries granting low-cost export
financing. In the early stages of development,
especially of the domestic financial system,
commercial banks tend to overestimate risks in
export sectors and may, thus, impede access to15
export credits. Government support is then con-
ceded to offset capital market imperfections.
Such imperfections are cured, however, once ef-
ficient financial institutions emerge and ex-
porters get access to credit facilities at market
rates. It follows that governments have only a
temporary role to play in this area.
c. Duty Drawbacks and Exemptions
Duty drawbacks and exemptions are the most
popular instruments of export promotion. They
enable exporters to buy imported inputs at inter-
nationally competitive prices. All ESAEs con-
sidered in this study have established drawback
or exemption schemes for imported inputs used
in export production. The relevance and effec-
tiveness of these schemes have differed signifi-
cantly, however. In Singapore, for example,
drawbacks have not been claimed frequently,
since import duties have been very low. Taiwan
granted its exporters a free trade status in the
early 1950s. Moreover, the effectiveness of
Taiwanese provisions has been enhanced by
simplifying administrative procedures gradually.
By contrast, the bureaucratic costs of claiming
duty drawbacks have been high in the Philip-
pines.
Asian experience suggests that duty exemp-
tions are preferable over drawbacks. The latter
involve financial costs for exporters since duty
payments on imported inputs are reimbursed
only after exports have taken place. However,
exemptions require a greater administrative
vigilance to avoid misuse of duty-free imports in
non-exportables. The costs of operating duty ex-
emption and drawback schemes can be reduced
by eliminating redundant tariffs, i.e., tariffs
which are higher than the difference between
domestic prices and world market prices. An-
other important point is that duty drawbacks and
exemptions should be given to producers of
domestic inputs, too. In other words, the
schemes should be neutral between foreign and
domestic input suppliers in order to fully exploit
comparative advantages in the production of in-
termediate goods. This requirement has been met
in most of the ESAEs. Duty exemptions and
drawbacks for imports of domestic firms supply-
ing inputs for export production have con-
tributed to increase the local supply of inter-
mediate goods.
d. Export Processing Zones and Bonded
Warehouses
Export processing zones and bonded manu-
facturing houses have been very popular among
ESAEs to assure a free trade status for export
producers (Spinanger 1984). Besides duty-free
access to imported inputs, manufacturers in
these zones are usually provided essential
services such as water, energy, telecommu-
nications, ports and containerized cargo facili-
ties. The incidence of local taxes and excise
duties is frequently lower for firms operating
there.
However, the role that special zones have
played in export promotion differs considerably
across countries and over time. In Taiwan, they
accounted for three quarters of the trade surplus
during 1971-1980. Parallel to trade liberali-
zation their importance declined substantially.
The same is true for Korea, where free trade
zones accounted for less than 3 per cent of ex-
ports and imports in 1990. This share has re-
mained below 10 per cent in the Philippines, al-
though free trade zones have been the most pre-
ferred export promotion scheme (GATT 1993a,
Vol. I: 109). Especially the Philippine ex-
perience suggests that for special zones to be
successful, they must not be delinked from re-
sources available in other parts of the country.
Thus, excessive import substitution policies
rendering such resources non-competitive by
world market standards undermine the effective-
ness of special zones in promoting exports.
e. Marketing and Institutional Support
Marketing and institutional support is an essen-
tial element of export promotion because it is in-
strumental to lower costs of information. This
should help domestic firms in creating proper
trade channels for exports. Even Hong Kong,
which does not promote exports actively through
other measures, provides institutional assistance
to exporters. Indonesia gives technical and fi-
nancial assistance for participation in trade fairs,
selling missions and trade promotion centres.
Malaysia has a broadly based arrangement to16
help exporters in market research, product de-
velopment and training in marketing, etc. Re-
portedly (e.g. Rhee 1985), the Korean Trade
Promotion Corporation and the Singapore Trade
Development Board have been fairly effective in
assisting exporters, e.g., in setting up overseas
offices and marketing new products. Moreover,
private trade associations have successfully co-
operated with government agencies in many
ESAEs. Overall, the experience of these coun-
tries shows that an outward oriented trade policy
includes efficient institutions to take care of ex-
port interests in foreign markets and investments
in creating market channels, rather than relying
exclusively on the initiative of foreign buyers.
/ Promotion of FDI
FDI can be a useful vehicle to expand exports
because multinational corporations (MNCs)
usually possess an international network of mar-
keting channels (see also Chapter B.III). Apart
from MNC affiliates using this network, market-
ing know-how may spill over from MNC af-
filiates to domestic firms in the host country.
FDI is also a means of filling up gaps in the field
of technology and management skills. ESAEs
offer a variety of incentives to foreign investors
in addition to those available for exports. FDI
incentives are sometimes linked to export per-
formance.
Yet, the Asian experience suggests that ex-
ports of MNC affiliates depend essentially on in-
ternational competitiveness of local factors of
production, rather than on performance require-
ments: If exports are as profitable as domestic
sales, obligatory export requirements are likely
to be redundant. If exports are less profitable
than domestic sales, foreign investors will com-
ply with export obligations only if they are com-
pensated (e.g., through tax privileges) or if pos-
sibilities for evasion exist (e.g., the burden of
export obligations may be reduced through
transfer pricing, notably overvoicing). Realizing
this, ESAEs have relaxed performance require-
ments considerably in the course of liberali-
zation. At the same time, the contribution of
foreign firms to the exports of ESAEs has in-
creased. This applies to Japanese MNCs in the
first place, which established plants in ESAEs in
the 1960s and 1970s primarily to produce for
third countries. As a consequence of the ap-
preciation of the yen, Japanese affiliates in
ESAEs are now increasingly exporting to their
home market.
g. Exchange Rate Adjustment
Successful export promotion requires an effec-
tive real exchange rate at which the country's
exports remain competitive. Many of the ESAEs
have achieved this by using export promotion
programmes as a means to raise the prices of
tradables and to offset negative consequences of
import protection. Consistent monetary and fis-
cal policies have helped to keep the exchange
rate competitive. Commodity-rich ESAEs have
been subject to considerable real exchange rate
fluctuations, however, because they have im-
ported price instability from international com-
modity markets. Under such conditions, dutch-
disease problems may have arisen unless the ef-
fects of exchange rate fluctuations on domestic
prices of non-tradables are sterilized. Hence,
specific promotion measures for non-commodity
exports had to be supplemented by efficient
monetary management in order to contain dutch-
disease effects.
h. Conclusions
Successful export promotion usually consists of
a number of measures, ranging from sound
macroeconomic policies to specific incentives
for exporters and foreign investors. The selec-
tion of policy instruments and their relative im-
portance depend on macroeconomic and struc-
tural conditions in a particular country. Never-
theless, some general lessons can be drawn from
the review of export promotion in ESAEs and
the effectiveness of different instruments.
The fundamental objective of export pro-
motion should be to prevent a policy-induced
bias against exportable products. The policy re-
gime should aim at equalizing the domestic re-
source costs of earning one unit of foreign ex-
change through exports with the domestic re-
source costs of saving one unit of foreign ex-
change through import substitution. The ideal
way to achieve a balanced incentive system
would be to eliminate tariffs as well as quanti-17
tative restrictions on all imports and exports,
and to keep the exchange rate at the purchasing
power parity of the currency. As long as this is
not possible, any implicit taxation of exports re-
sulting from import substitution policies must be
compensated. Duty drawbacks and exemptions
for inputs absorbed in exports have a central
role to play in such a transitory second-best
solution. Exporters should have free access to
domestic as well as foreign inputs. Some of the
problems related to the implementation of duty
drawbacks and exemptions can be solved
through export processing zones and bonded
warehouses. The former tend to lose their impor-
tance with the liberalization of trade, but the
latter may remain useful even at a higher level of
integration of the economy into world markets.
In order to sustain international competitiveness,
overvaluation of the real exchange rate must be
avoided. Monetary and fiscal discipline is
crucially important in this respect
Moreover, the Asian experience supports the
following conclusions:
- Marketing and institutional support can be
helpful especially for smaller and newcoming
exporters.
- FDI may not only provide much needed
capital, technology and human skills, but may
also contribute directly to export growth. In
attempting to attract FDI, it should be kept in
mind that FDI inflows depend more on the
host country's growth prospects and macro-
economic stability than on specific promotion
measures (Agarwal et al. 1991).
- Export subsidies in the ESAEs mainly
granted in the form of tax rebates or exemp-
tions and credit facilities at interest rates be-
low market rates are said to account for
greater assistance to exporters than duty
drawbacks or exemptions (Liitkenhorst 1984:
60; Akrasanee and Wiboonchutikula 1994:
439). However, the evidence on the effective-
ness of subsidies is mixed. Success stories
from Asia contrast with failures in many
Latin American economies. In any case, it is
not advisable to assign a high ranking to
direct subsidies for promoting exports. They
have increasingly become subject to counter-
vailing duties and are allowed by the rules of
WTO only for a transitionary period.
In designing an appropriate package of export
promotion, it should be kept in mind that: (i)
specific export incentives should be comple-
mentary and cannot substitute for macro-
economic stability; (ii) export promotion in-
volves costs in terms of subsidies, foregone
revenues and administrative expenses, and there-
fore must be considered as an investment which
has to be subjected to cost benefit analysis as
any other investment; (iii) export promotion
should be given only for a limited period, and
exit rules should be clear from the very be-
ginning; (iv) interventions should be such that a
competitive environment for private business is
maintained, thereby providing incentives for an
efficient allocation of resources and tech-
nological improvement.
II. Mastering New Technologies
Growth and sectoral change in the exports from
ESAEs since the 1960s have been accompanied
by their increasing diversification and tech-
nological sophistication. This is illustrated by
the increasing share of technology-intensive
products in OECD imports from this region. The
relative importance of resource-based and
labour-intensive goods has declined accordingly
(Liicke 1995: Table 12.1). The metaphore of
'flying geese' has been used to illustrate the re-
sulting pattern of structural change. Each coun-
try continuously acquires competitive advantage
in industries that require the mastery of hitherto
unused, and increasingly demanding tech-
nologies. As per capita income rises, less so-
phisticated industries migrate to neighbouring
countries with a lower level of economic devel-
opment and, therefore, lower wages. While
Japan has led the way, the first-generation NIEs
have by now also experienced a substantial shift
away from traditional, labour-intensive in-
dustries.
It is safe to state, therefore, that the con-
tinuous acquisition of technological and mana-
gerial know-how has been a precondition for the18
fast growth of ESAEs' exports. While the pri-
vate sector has accounted for most manu-
factured exports from this region and has been
responsible for most investment in specific new
technologies, government policy has played a
two-fold role in facilitating technological
change. First, government policies such as the
trade and exchange rate regime affect many of
the channels through which the transfer of for-
eign technologies may take place. Second, the
successful application of new technologies de-
pends on local technological capability, that is
the ability to select, adapt, diffuse, and build
upon imported technology. Local technological
capability is influenced by government policy in
several areas, most prominently in education.
The following two subsections discuss the policy
implications of the experience of ESAEs in each
of these fields.
1. Technology Transfer
Channels of technology transfer may be clas-
sified by the demands they make on the user's
technological capability (and, correspondingly,
the intensity of the relationship between the
supplier and the user of the transferred tech-
nology).
1
0 One extreme is represented by FDI in
the form of turn-key plants where the new tech-
nology is not only supplied by, but also used
under the direct control of the parent company.
Initially at least, there may be little reliance on
local inputs other than labour, and corre-
spondingly limited scope for technological
learning.
Technology licensing and the purchase of
equipment embodying new technology involve
more of an arms-length relationship between
suppliers and users. As a result, the efficient use
of these channels depends on the user's ability to
obtain and process sufficient information to
choose among available techniques, and to adapt
the new technology to local conditions with only
limited support from the supplier. This applies
even more strongly to technological information
obtained from customers, especially foreign im-
porters, or from sources in the public domain
(e.g., trade journals, fairs), or by studying and
working abroad.
Like in other fields, there is no one East Asian
model of technology transfer. The role played by
the various channels in the individual ESAEs
has varied widely in accordance with national
industrial policies. This is especially true for
FDI. Following the Japanese example, South
Korea and Taiwan erected barriers against FDI
in the earlier phases of their economic develop-
ment, on the grounds that it would limit the
scope for the build-up of technological capa-
bility by nationally owned firms. By contrast,
Malaysia and Thailand actively encouraged
FDI, for example in export processing zones.
The experience of these countries shows that
linkages with the host economies increased over
time as especially the affiliates of Japanese mul-
tinational companies redirected their sourcing
towards local markets. In a marked departure
from the Latin American experience, most
ESAEs granted no protection to FDI oriented
mainly towards production for the local market
with few export prospects. This is significant
because such protection reduces incentives for
cost minimization, and hence for the application
of the most recent production technology.
Partly to compensate for the earlier absence
of FDI, the South Korean government (among
others) has encouraged the use of licensing
agreements to obtain access to foreign tech-
nology. Although the impact of such agreements
is difficult to assess, several considerations sug-
gest that their scope must have been limited.
Firms in industrialized countries will hardly
transfer proprietary technology to potential
competitors in the world market if this is likely
to undermine their competitive position. As long
as firms at the technological frontier are them-
selves involved in manufacturing, they will
probably either insist on segmenting the export
market, or they will only transfer less than up-
to-date technology. Limitations on exports may
be difficult to verify. Using slightly outmoded
production techniques may be appropriate in the
early stages of industrialization, as the discus-
sion about the efficiency of second-hand ma-
chinery in developing countries demonstrates.
This is true, however, only under the assumption
that technical progress is mainly labour-saving,
and that factor prices differ significantly.19
Overall, therefore, the role of licensing in tech-
nology transfer to Asia has probably been
limited.
Since neither FDI nor licensing appear to
have been crucial in ESAEs such as Korea, this
leaves the purchase of equipment embodying
new technology, and information gathering in the
course of exporting as the most important chan-
nels of technology transfer. Both channels offer
a wide range of options with respect to the de-
mands made on the technological capability of
the user. Purchased equipment may be in the
form of turn-key plants, for example, or may in-
volve a combination of machinery from different
foreign suppliers with significant local ad-
aptation. Similarly, an exporting firm may con-
centrate on manufacturing operations while the
importing firm is responsible for product design,
quality control, and overseas marketing, or ex-
porters may perform some or all of these func-
tions themselves. A large number of case studies
suggest that many Asian firms have transformed
themselves along these lines. They typically
started as mere manufacturers using stan-
dardized technologies, but successively built up
their technological and management capabilities,




Two policy implications follow. First, access
to lowest-cost sourcing is of paramount im-
portance if emerging industries are to become in-
ternationally competitive. A vivid counter-ex-
ample is provided by industrial policy for the
machinery sector in Brazil and India. In both
countries, the protection granted to this sector
raised prices for many types of machinery above
the world market level and placed a heavy bur-
den on downstream industries. Second, the
ability to export is not only a crucial test of the
economic viability of an emerging industry. Ex-
porting also conveys substantial amounts of
commercial and technological information that
would otherwise not reach many firms, or which
firms would have no incentive to obtain if they
produced only for a protected domestic market.
This latter point applies especially to infor-
mation in the public domain, such as the in-
formation which can be obtained from spe-
cialized journals, visiting trade fairs, studying
abroad etc. These considerations underscore the
beneficial effects of avoiding any bias of in-
centives against exports and in favour of the
domestic market, or against international
sourcing and in favour of domestic suppliers.
Arguably, most governments of ESAEs man-
aged to abide by this role even when they ac-
tively promoted emerging industries.
2. Local Technological Capability
Ensuring that domestic firms have access to
foreign technology through appropriate channels
was only a necessary, but not a sufficient con-
dition for successful technical change.
1
2 In ad-
dition, local firms needed to acquire techno-
logical capability, which may be defined as the
ability to select, adapt, and apply hitherto un-
known technologies. New technology may be
understood widely to refer to innovations in both
hardware, such as new machinery, and software,
such as organization, business administration,
marketing etc. The importance of building tech-
nological capability is emphasized, in general
terms, by all students of East Asian develop-
ment. What is less clear is the relative im-
portance of formal education at the primary,
secondary and tertiary levels vs. learning on the
job.
The classification of formal education as in-
vestment in human capital reflects the fact that
resources are spent on an activity (schooling,
etc.) whose economic return is only realized in
the future. Since a large proportion of the social
cost of education is directly borne by the gov-
ernment, public policy plays a pivotal role in
this field. It is clear that export and GDP
growth, which involves structural change to-
wards technologically sophisticated industries,
cannot be sustained unless the educational level
of the workforce is improved accordingly.
Therefore growth of income and manufactured
exports, in Asia and elsewhere, has been accom-
panied by rising levels of education.
The direction of the causality, however, is not
very clear. Do improvements in formal edu-
cation lead to structural change in industry and
income growth, or does income growth create
incentives (and resources) for higher investment20
in formal education? Studies of growth episodes
such as the British Industrial Revolution or the
Green Revolution in Indian Agriculture suggest
that frequently the impetus for economic growth
did not come from increased human capital, but
from exogenous factors such as technological
innovations. Similarly, although the fast-
growing ESAEs had high initial levels of formal
education (compared with many poor countries),
these were not higher than in other countries
with a more modest growth performance. It is
also important to notice that the educational
level of a country's labour force can normally
change only slowly to the extent to which new
entrants have a higher educational level than
those who leave the labour force. Accordingly, it
is difficult to see how improvements in formal
education can constitute an engine of economic
growth, rather than a high educational standard
being a necessary initial condition.
It has been suggested that learning on the job
constitutes an important alternative form of
human capital formation. The underlying
rationale is that workers and managers with
more experience, just like those with more edu-
cation, earn higher wages and salaries. In con-
trast to formal education, learning on the job is
not normally the result of any conscious invest-
ment of resources. Rather, it occurs as a result
of gathering experience in the performance of a
new activity, in the sense that the time required
to perform a certain task declines with cumu-
lative output. It is important to note that for
learning on the job to become a constant source
of productivity increases, new activities must be
started continuously because otherwise the
potential for productivity improvements through
learning will soon be exhausted.
Learning on the job is an attractive ex-
planation of the growing technological capability
of many Asian exporters. It allows the pro-
fessional qualifications of many members of the
labour force to improve simultaneously. This is
in contrast to formal education which normally
affects only new entrants. If one adds the ex-
tensive microeconomic evidence on learning ef-
fects, it is plausible to assume that learning by
doing has played an important role in the ac-
quisition of technological capability in fast-
growing ESAEs.
1
3 This raises a crucial ques-
tion, however. By what mechanism was invest-
ment attracted to activities of growing tech-
nological sophistication that left ample room for
learning by doing and subsequent productivity
improvements, but were not so advanced as to
overstrain complementary factors of production
such as formal education levels? In the latter
case, new branches of industry would have been
economically unviable even in the medium to
long run, as exemplified by the Brazilian elec-
tronics industry throughout much of the 1980s.
The answer to this question depends on the
incentive structure for investment, and therefore
varies with each country's policy environment.
In some countries, for instance in South Korea,
industrial targeting has probably been instru-
mental in this respect. Elsewhere, capital accu-
mulation has responded to a larger degree to
market mechanisms. Throughout the region,
however, whatever government support an in-
dustry received was tied to its becoming a viable
exporter within a reasonable timespan. This
would have been impossible for an industry that
was fundamentally ill-suited for a particular
country given, in particular, the industry's tech-
nological sophistication and the country's tech-
nological capability.
In terms of policy implications, this obser-
vation leads back to the crucial role of openness
to trade for East Asian development. Beyond
this, the diversity of policy environments sug-
gests that a fertile climate for productive invest-
ment may be created in different ways (with a
few fundamentals, such as macroeconomic sta-
bility). Furthermore, a good education system is
clearly important, preferably with an emphasis
on technical and managerial skills. It is not,
however, a sufficient condition for economic
growth.
III. Globalization and Networking
within Asia
The preceding sections have shown that the fac-
tors contributing to ESAEs' favourable world-
market performance went far beyond narrowly
defined export promotion schemes. Rather, they21
included macroeconomic stability, improved
technological capabilities and human capital
formation. Apart from their direct role in sus-
taining export growth, such factors also con-
tributed indirectly to ESAEs' world-market suc-
cess. First, they helped the region to become an
attractive location for foreign investment which
was export-oriented to a large extent. Second,
economic linkages within Asia were strength-
ened in this way; both intra-regional trade and
investment were supported. These less obvious,
though important determinants of the region's
export performance are discussed in the follow-
ing.
1. FDI and World-Market Performance
As a matter of fact, ESAEs have become pre-
ferred destinations for FDI (Table 1). In 1993,
FDI flows to all developing countries (DCs) in
Asia amounted to more than five times the figure
for 1987; the region's share in world-wide FDI
flows soared to 26 per cent. Booming FDI in
China contributed significantly to this develop-
ment. Southeast Asian countries, too, attracted
substantially higher FDI flows. Malaysia, for
which inflows increased more than tenfold in the
period 1987-1993, figures prominently within
this group.








































































a1992. — ''Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Source: ADB Asian Development Outlook 1994, IMF
Balance of Payments Yearbook 1994.
All major investor countries have expanded
their engagement in Asian DCs, albeit to varying
degree and from different starting levels (for
details, see Agarwal et al. 1995):
- FDI outflows from the EU to Asian DCs
more than doubled, when the periods 1990-
1991 and 1986-1987 are compared. Never-
theless, the region remained a minor host for
EU investors who preferred intra-EU en-
gagements during the process of European
integration.
- US FDI stocks in manufacturing industries of
Asian DCs nearly quadrupled since 1985, and
accounted for 7.2 per cent of world-wide US
FDI stocks in manufacturing in 1993. The US
engagement was concentrated on the most ad-
vanced economies among Asian DCs, par-
ticularly on Singapore and Hong Kong.
- For Japanese firms, the Asian region has tra-
ditionally been a preferred investment loca-
tion. In the mid-1980s, roughly one fifth of to-
tal Japanese FDI outflows in manufacturing
was directed to Asian DCs, the share of which
amounted to one third in 1993. The focus of
Japan's engagement in manufacturing within
Asia has shifted over time, from NIEs to
ASEAN countries such as Indonesia and
Malaysia and, recently, to China.
The impact of Asia's attractiveness for FDI
on its export performance is difficult to quantify.
Nevertheless, the proposition is well founded
that large and rising inflows of foreign risk capi-
tal have contributed considerably to sustainable
export growth. Empirical analyses have shown
that FDI and trade flows are positively cor-
related.
1
4 Higher outflows of FDI from Ger-
many, Japan and the United States (representing
three major suppliers of FDI) to industrialized
and developing host countries went hand in hand
with higher exports from the hosts to the home
countries of foreign investors (and with higher
bilateral trade in the opposite direction, too).
Both bilateral FDI and trade flows appear to be
driven by a common set of determinants. The
steep increase of world-wide FDI over the last
decade or so, and the close links between trade
and FDI can be attributed to globalization
strategies of multinational enterprises. Inno-
vative production techniques, dramatically re-
duced transaction and communication costs, the22
liberalization of capital markets and related de-
velopments have added new dimensions to the
international division of labour. Production
processes can increasingly be fragmented and
relocated to countries offering the most favour-
able conditions for producing certain goods or
parts thereof, which can then be supplied on
world markets at competitive terms.
In the present context, this means that attrac-
tive investment locations in Asia have had better
chances to penetrate world markets. ESAEs
could derive particularly large benefits from the
trend towards globalized production. Although
exact data are not available, the share of world-
market oriented FDI in total inflows appears to
be higher in ESAEs than in other regions.
1
5 This
type of FDI is directly linked with export ex-
pansion and export diversification, in contrast to
FDI that is mainly oriented at the domestic mar-
kets of host countries.
The proposition that ESAEs have been among
the first to gain from globalization is supported
by various observations. Japanese firms which
are among the leading investors in ESAEs are
well known for their world-market orientation.
In countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand, foreign firms accounted for more
than half of manufactured exports. Furthermore,
much of ESAEs' recent export activity has been
in sectors in which FDI and the associated trans-
fer of technology and industrial know-how have
been substantial. Both FDI in, and manufactured
exports of ESAEs have shifted to more skill-in-
tensive industries.
2. Complementarity in Supply
Arguably, it has mainly been the favourable
world-market performance of the most advanced
East Asian NIEs that has benefitted from the
globalization strategies of multinational enter-
prises. However, Asia's success has spread well
beyond this relatively small group of frontrun-
ners. Close networking within the region pro-
vided the principal mechanism through which
diffusion was achieved. An intra-regional divi-
sion of labour was encouraged by strong com-
plementarities in the supply structures of Asian
DCs.
1
6 The most relevant factors shaping com-
plementarities include the following:
1
7
- Per capita income ranged from about US$200
in countries such as Bangladesh to US$6,800 in
South Korea and more than US$15,000 in Hong
Kong and Singapore. The per capita stock of
physical and human capital typically being re-
lated to differences in income, the relative en-
dowment with these production factors can be
assumed to differ vastly within Asia.
- Measured by population size, small countries
such as the two city states contrast with large
countries with huge domestic markets, notably
China and India. Related to this are dramatic
differences in terms of trade shares in GDP; im-
ports plus exports amounted to about 300 per
cent of GDP in Singapore, 140 per cent in
Malaysia, but only 20 per cent in India, for ex-
ample.
- The degree of industrialization, measured by
the share of manufacturing in GDP, was ex-
tremely low in countries such as Bangladesh (9
per cent), moderate in Indonesia (21 per cent),
and relatively high in South Korea, Singapore
and Thailand (26-28 per cent). Corre-
spondingly, the primary sector remained domi-
nant in some Asian DCs, whereas it played a
marginal role elsewhere in the region. For ex-
ample, the two relatively resource-rich ASEAN
countries (Indonesia and Malaysia) and China
are complementary to the resource-poor NIEs.
Strong complementarities imply that Asian
DCs have various locational advantages to offer,
ranging from favourable resource endowments
and abundant low-paid labour to human skills
and expertise, as well as booming domestic mar-
kets and investible surpluses. Significant differ-
ences in the structure of merchandise exports are
the consequence (Table 2). Primary commodities
(including fuels etc.) still figure prominently in
the export basket of resource-rich economies,
notably Indonesia, although their share is clearly
declining relative to manufactured goods. Low-
income countries in South Asia have moved
rapidly into production and exports of relatively
labour-intensive goods such as textiles and
clothing. At the same time, the advanced East23
Table 2 — The Structure of Merchandise Exports of
Selected Asian DCs, 1992 (per cent)
Table 3 - Development of Intra-Asian Trade, 1980-1992























































































Source: World Bank World Development Report 1994.
Asian NIEs have shifted away from traditional
exports.
1
8 Sophisticated and relatively skill-in-
tensive export items, e.g. machinery and trans-
port equipment, have reached a dominant posi-
tion in the world-market supply of some of these
economies. Second-generation exporters such as
Malaysia are following suit.
3. Intra-Regional Trade
In addition to this general pattern of speciali-
zation, the above-mentioned complementarities
have provided favourable conditions for a mar-
ket-driven integration within the Asian region.
Regional networking has proceeded with respect
to both trade and FDI. As concerns trade, the
share of intra-regional exports in total Asian ex-
ports has risen considerably, especially since the
mid-1980s (Table 3).
1
9 In 1992, about 37 per
cent of exports of Asian DCs went to other
Asian DCs; for total exports (manufactured ex-
ports) this share increased by 13.5 (14.9) per-
centage points between 1980 and 1992. Includ-
ing Japan, the intra-regional trade share sur-
passed 44 per cent of total exports in 1992.
The intra-Asian trade network has involved
all major subgroups, though less so in the case
of South Asia (Table 4). The exceptionally high
share of Chinese exports accounted for by Asian






Asian DCs Asian DCs
plus Japan
Manufactured exports
Asian DCs Asian DCs
plus Japan
24.0 37.0 21.7 27.0
29.8 38.3 26.6 31.5
33.2 41.1 32.2 35.7
37.5 44.1 36.6 39.6
Source: UN (1994).

























































Source: ADB Asian Development Outlook 1994.
the two city states played the leading role. Apart
from that, Table 4 reveals two interesting
features. First, the proposition of comple-
mentarities to have induced intra-regional trade
is supported by significant trade relations be-
tween subgroups that are characterized by pro-
nounced differences in terms of per capita in-
come and income-related resource endowments.
Evidence in favour of intensive trading because
of geographical proximity and low transaction
costs
2
0 is provided by (lower income) China and
(higher income) Japan serving as outlets for the
exports of Asian NIEs. The observation that
about one fifth of Southeast Asian exports is ab-
sorbed by Asian NIEs, and another fifth by
Japan represents another example that fits into
this picture. Second, the trade matrix reveals
that the inter-industry pattern of trade between
Asian countries at different stages of economic
development has been supplemented by trade
relations between economies with similar per
capita income: 12 per cent of the exports of




These observations suggest that the export
dynamism within Asia has been driven by inter-
industry trade and intra-industry trade. The op-24
portunities for mutual exchanges of goods within
the same product category have improved es-
pecially since the mid-1980s.
2
2 Intra-industry
specialization is due to fast-growing per capita
income, convergence in income levels, pro-
gressing industrialization, emerging similarities
in demand and production structures, and de-
clining transaction costs. At the country level,
Hong Kong and Singapore reveal the highest de-
gree of intra-industry trade, partly because of
their status as entrepots for China and ASEAN
countries. Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan
rank next. For these three economies, the level of
intra-industry trade was particularly high in
technology-intensive goods, which is probably
the result of successful integration into the
globalization strategies of multinational enter-
prises. Apart from trade relations between Asian
NIEs, intra-industry trade was most pronounced
in trade between the NIEs on the one hand, and
Japan and ASEAN on the other hand. By con-
trast, trade between Japan and ASEAN coun-
tries was dominated by inter-industry speciali-
zation. The same applies to China's trade with
Japan and ASEAN. The proposition that intra-
industry trade helped to sustain export ex-
pansion is supported by the observation that
subregions with high shares of intra-industry
trade in total trade benefitted overproportionally
from export growth within the Asian region.
4. Investment Linkages within Asia
The second dimension of Asian networking re-
lates to intra-regional investment. Notwith-
standing considerable data constraints, the
"flying geese" pattern of specialization within
this region is also evident from the development
of intra-Asian FDI.
2
3 Initially, Japan's move
towards more sophisticated lines of production
stimulated Japanese FDI in neighbouring
ESAEs. FDI was concentrated on sectors in
which Japan had lost comparative advantage be-
cause of substantial real wage increases. Par-
ticularly Asian NIEs benefitted from the reloca-
tion of Japanese production and its favourable
impact on economic growth, exports, employ-
ment generation and access to technology. In the
1980s, about half of total FDI in South Korea
originated from Japan, whose share was also
significant in Taiwan and Thailand (Table 5).

































































Source: Riedel (1991: 142).
Although Japan's engagement in some coun-
tries of the region (notably in Indonesia) declined
in relative terms after 1985, intra-Asian FDI
gathered further momentum. In the next phase, it
was mainly Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan
which became major investors in neighbouring
countries. While South Korea was somewhat
lagging behind, the Asian NIEs basically fol-
lowed the Japanese route of exporting human
and physical capital to less advanced economies
in the region. For example, about 10 per cent of
total FDI in Indonesia and Thailand came from
Hong Kong in the period 1980-1988. In the late
1980s, Asian investors accounted for nearly two
thirds of total FDI approved by a group of four
Southeast Asian DCs (Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Thailand). Hong Kong was the sec-
ond largest source of FDI in Indonesia, and
among the top five sources for the Philippines
and Thailand. Also similar to Japanese FDI,
most of the Asian NIEs' engagement has been
export-oriented, thereby further strengthening
the export sectors of recipient countries.
Most recently, new patterns of intra-Asian
FDI have emerged. Asian NIEs shifted their
engagement from countries such as Indonesia,
the Philippines and Thailand to China, where
Hong Kong and Taiwan became top investors
and surpassed Japan.
2
4 At the same time, com-
panies from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand
undertook significant investments, for example,25
in China and Vietnam. China invested in Hong
Kong in areas such as financial services. In
other words, intra-Asian FDI flows have
emerged from countries that were originally only
recipients.
The changing pattern of intra-Asian FDI has
driven by the need for industrial restructuring
going along with higher per capita income and
rising wages. Fast-growing and relatively ad-
vanced ESAEs have lost their earlier com-
parative advantage in labour-intensive manu-
facturing. They increasingly attracted FDI in
activities with a higher value added, while relo-
cating part of their traditional production by in-
vesting in low-wage economies in the region.
This explains why countries such as Thailand
are seeking possibilities in Vietnam while, at the
same time, actively courting foreign investors
(ADB 1994: 16). In this way, FDI facilitates
moving up the ladder of comparative advantage
both in the source countries, which shift to more
sophisticated activities, and in the host countries,
whose industrial employment and non-traditional
exports expand (Riedel 1991:143).
5. The Role of Economic Policy
While the factors behind the rapid growth of
intra-Asian trade and FDI are numerous,
2
5 suc-
cessful industrial restructuring has been at the
heart of both favourable world-market perform-
ance and regional networking. It should be no-
ticed, however, that the division of labour at the
regional level has been market-driven in the first
place. In contrast to Europe, the decline in
transaction costs (for example, comprising lower
trade barriers, improved transportation facilities
and reduced uncertainty) has been achieved
without institutionalized regionalism (see also
Panagariya 1993). Interestingly enough, eco-
nomic transactions expanded particularly be-
tween countries with unsettled or even non-ex-
istent political relations. Taiwanese FDI in PR
China provides an example. By contrast, eco-
nomic relations remained comparatively weak
between ESAEs that had established some in-
stitutionalized links. ASEAN is a case in point:
little progress has been made in reducing trade
barriers, and intra-ASEAN FDI accounts for
only a small share of ASEAN's total FDI in-
flows (Yue 1993).
If at all, regionalism has evolved along rather
unconventional lines in Asia. Intra-regional co-
operation has been attempted to some extent
through more informal arrangements, such as
so-called growth triangles, i.e., production
sharing in border areas of countries with differ-
ent factor endowments. The SIJORI growth tri-
angle represents a well-known example: the co-
operation among Singapore, the southern
Malaysian state of Johor and the west Indo-
nesian province of Riau resulted in growing
subregional investment in 1987-1991 (Yue
1993: 89). Likewise, joint projects based on
complementarities were launched in the China
Economic Area encompassing southern China,
Hong Kong and Taiwan.
The marginal role of institutionalized re-
gionalism does not imply, however, that eco-
nomic policy initiatives of Asian governments
have been unimportant with regard to the coun-
tries' locational attractiveness and regional net-
working. Quite the contrary, policy reforms
provided a major stimulus for industrial restruc-
turing according to the countries' comparative
advantage. Trade liberalization and the devel-
opment of financial markets figure prominently
in this respect. Although free-trade economies
such as Hong Kong and Singapore are the ex-
ception in Asia, too, import restrictions have
been liberalized considerably in most ESAEs
during the 1980s and early 1990s.
2
6 Important
common features of recent trade policy reforms
comprise unilateral dismantling of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions, substitution of tariffs
for non-tariff barriers, and reduced tariff esca-
lation by cutting peak tariff rates. In particular,
the latter development has encouraged intra-
Asian trade in the manufacturing sector in which
peak tariffs had prevailed.
Financial market reforms have reduced uncer-
tainty, enhanced the stability of the regulatory
framework and provided better chances to draw
on new sources of capital. During the 1980s,
domestic capital markets were deregulated, ac-
cess barriers were lowered, and administered in-
terest rates were liberalized (notably in South-
east Asian DCs). Moreover, international capital26
mobility was supported by removing foreign ex-
change controls and other regulations governing
foreign portfolio investment (For details, see
Greenwood 1993). The move towards liberali-
zation started from a fairly restrictive policy
stance in countries such as South Korea and
Taiwan, while financial transactions by non-
residents had been virtually unrestricted in Hong
Kong in the past already.
The attractiveness of the region for FDI in
general, and intra-Asian FDI in particular, has
benefitted from substantial revisions of foreign
investment policies (Chen 1993; ADB 1990).
FDI inflows have been liberalized by ASEAN
countries, China, South Korea and Taiwan,
notably since the mid-1980s. Sectors previously
considered "sensitive" were opened to FDI, and
restrictions on profit remittances were relaxed.
As a result, FDI policies of ESAEs have con-
verged at a lower regulatory level. Another
major impulse to the rapid growth of intra-Asian
FDI was provided by the more liberal policy
stance towards FDI outflows. This applies
especially to South Korea and Taiwan since
1987, while Hong Kong has been the pioneer
among Asian NIEs in terms of FDI outflows.
In summary, the 1980s and early 1990s have
seen substantial efforts towards economic de-
regulation and liberalisation in ESAEs. The less
restrictive attitude towards imports and FDI has
encouraged industrial restructuring and, thereby,
supported sustainable export growth in general
and intra-Asian trade in particular. The expan-
sion of both trade and investment has generally
been the highest in countries where the process
of liberalization has been the most advanced.
C. Applicability of the ESAE's Strategy to CEECs
I. Initial Conditions
By their very nature, cross-country comparisons
of the effectiveness of economic policies are
counterfactual exercises. In order to assess the
relevance of experiences of one particular group
of countries for another group, initial conditions
and structural characteristics of the economies
under consideration must be compared. Sub-
sequently, we consider some important differ-
ences between CEECs and ESAEs, and the
question is raised whether starting conditions
have worked in favour of the latter.
2
7 Under
rather unfavourable conditions, it may be diffi-
cult for CEECs to copy the Asian experience;
then, similar export promotion policies will not
automatically result in similarly strong export
expansion and diversification.
Initial conditions may be divided into politi-
cal, macroeconomic and structural factors.
Political factors may influence the acceptability
of policy measures. The responsiveness of pro-
ducers and investors to policy changes and, thus,
the adjustment flexibility of the economy is
likely to be higher if the government's credibility
is beyond serious doubt. Macroeconomic in-
stability may erode the effectiveness of export
promotion policies unless they are closely linked
to fiscal and monetary consolidation, which is a
more demanding task than partial reforms in one
specific policy area. Likewise, structural char-
acteristics indicating significant domestic distor-
tions and rigidities render it more difficult to
foster export expansion and diversification.
ESAEs' favourable world-market perform-
ance has been helped by the reputation that gov-
ernments had achieved in providing for a co-
herent and credible policy environment
(Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al. 1991). The ab-
sence of considerable uncertainty has encour-
aged private economic agents to react promptly
to economic policy initiatives such as export in-
centives. However, the role of the overall politi-
cal regime in reducing uncertainty and strength-
ening the governments' credibility is open to de-
bate. The evidence on successful and failed re-
form experiments, particularly in Latin America,
reveals that an authoritarian policy regime is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
export and growth-enhancing economic policies.
The Argentine government, for example, re-27
gained credibility only after the move towards
democracy.
This suggests that the success of ESAEs,
which was achieved by authoritarian govern-
ments with few exceptions, may well be repeated
under democratic conditions. For CEECs there
has been no alternative from the very beginning
but to achieve government credibility and con-
fidence of economic agents together with de-
mocratization. Non-democratic governments
were largely discredited at the end of the social-
ist era. Newly elected governments commanded
considerable support in the early phases of eco-
nomic and political transition. In some instances,
however, their reputational bonus has melted
away rather quickly. Reform-minded parties
have lost their majority in reelections, and politi-
cal uncertainty has become a major problem in
countries such as Poland. The effectiveness of
economic reforms in general, and export pro-
motion policies in particular can no longer be
taken for granted, once the confidence of pro-
ducers and investors has been eroded.
Typically, the credibility of governments in
ESAEs went along with fairly stable macro-
economic conditions. Inflation, the level and
volatility of which are clear indications of eco-
nomic instability, was kept at bay (Table 6).
This encouraged domestic savings. High and
rising saving rates rendered it possible to finance
world-market oriented investment on a sustain-
able basis. By contrast, some CEECs (notably
Poland) started their economic transition in the
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 b1990.—n.a. = not available.
Source: World Bank World Development Report (various
issues).
midst of macroeconomic turbulences. This may
have reduced the effectiveness of trade policy re-
forms in the short run. Thus, the informative
value of relative prices was still limited, and ex-
port-oriented investors faced problems in raising
funds from capital markets. Furthermore, with
fiscal consolidation ranking high on the policy
agenda, governments were constrained in pro-
viding public financing of export promotion
schemes.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude
that macroeconomic starting conditions gener-
ally were much worse than in ESAEs. The
former Czechoslovakia, for example, had main-
tained macroeconomic stability even before the
regime change, and prudent fiscal policies
helped the country to return to one-digit inflation
rates shortly after price liberalization. Moreover,
domestic savings rates in CEECs matched the
East Asian standard, and were much higher than
in South Asia. While shortages of consumption
goods may have resulted in "forced savings" in
CEECs, Table 6 does not support the proposi-
tion that the domestic financing of world-market
oriented investment was seriously constrained
because of insufficient savings. Arguably, the
lack of efficient financial intermediation between
savers and investors represented a much more
critical bottleneck.
2
8 Under socialist conditions,
banks had performed a passive role in allocating
resources according to the directives of central
planners. After the regime change, many of these
banks remained state-owned entities for quite
some time. They were burdened with inherited
non-performing debt, and the institutional pre-
requisites for well functioning domestic capital
markets were not yet in place. These legacies re-
sulted in rather perverse incentive structures,
which led bank managers to throw good money
after the bad one. Traditional credit relations
with overindebted customers, notably large en-
terprises that were still state-owned, were main-
tained, thereby discriminating against the
emerging private sector and hampering a world-
market oriented reallocation of investment funds.
CEECs faced a pressing need to reorient ex-
ports to OECD markets after the collapse of
CMEA trade. While ESAEs had become com-
petitive suppliers of manufactures during the28
1970s and 1980s, the starting conditions for
CEECs to penetrate OECD markets were rather
difficult in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their
supply of manufactured exports was rarely
competitive by world-market standards. Not-
withstanding the sometimes heavy subsidization
of exports, the OECD accounted for only about
20 per cent of total exports of CEECs at the
beginning of economic transition, i.e., less than
half the corresponding share for Asian DCs
(Table 7).
Table 7-OECD Imports of Manufactures from CEECs





































Source: World Bank World Development Report (various
issues).
The distorted regional trade pattern of
CEECs, which was the result of the adminis-
tered division of labour within the former social-
ist bloc in the first place, did not prove to be the
most serious problem hindering economic
catching-up processes such as in Asia, however.
The reorientation of exports proceeded rather
quickly after the regime change. This was partly
due to the dismantling of former OECD trade
restrictions against CMEA countries and, spe-
cifically, because of preferential access to EU
markets. The more relevant differences between
CEECs and ESAEs concern initial income lev-
els, related structural characteristics, and rigidi-
ties inherited from the socialist era, which were
largely unknown in Asia.
The most obvious difference between the two
country groups is that economic catching-up in
Asia started from a fairly low income level
(Table 8). In the late 1970s, GNP per capita was
still below US$ 1,000 in most economies of this
region. Even considering that data on per capita
income in CEECs for the year 1989 are not very
reliable, it can safely be concluded that eco-
nomic transformation was initiated at a signifi-
cantly higher level of economic development
The potential for catching-up through learning
from, and imitation of, more advanced econ-
omies becomes smaller with the rise of per
capita income. More importantly, though, the
short-run effectiveness of policy reforms may
suffer if previous development efforts are stalled
because of serious legacies in terms of resource
misallocation and structural distortions.
Table 8 - Per Capita Income in CEECs and Asian DCs,






































Source: World Bank World Development Report (various
issues).
In accordance with the "normal" sectoral pat-
tern of economic development, low-income DCs
in Asia could draw on a large agricultural labour
force in the early phases of catching-up. In-
creased productivity in agriculture provided the
emerging industrial sector with an abundant
supply of relatively cheap labour. In the late
1970s, agriculture still accounted for about one
quarter of GDP in relatively advanced East
Asian DCs (Table 9). By contrast, the trans-
formation process of CEECs started from a re-
markably high degree of industrialization. The
sectoral contributions to GDP suggest that the
priority of industrial development under central
planning has resulted in excessive industriali-
zation and significant discrimination against
agriculture.
Economic transformation has implied a cor-
rection of distorted production structures in
CEECs. Price liberalization revealed a new set
of relative prices which was likely to deviate
substantially from the administered relative29
Table 9 — Share of Industry and Agriculture in GDP of
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Source: World Bank World Development Report (various
issues).
prices of the past. Resource misallocation and
the "true" value of sector-specific capital stocks
in previously subsidized and protected industries
became evident. The required reallocation of re-
sources could not take place over night. Rather,
structural rigidities added to the transition crisis,
the duration and depth of which depended on the
degree of inherited distortions. Economic policy
reforms designed along the lines suggested by
the Asian success stories could, thus, not rea-
sonably be expected to have immediate effects
similar to what ESAEs had experienced at the
beginning of their catching-up.
Within industry, too, structural differences
between ESAEs and CEECs have rendered ex-
port expansion and diversification more difficult
to achieve for the latter group of countries.
First, the earlier promotion of industrialization
in CEECs had been associated with a bias to-
wards heavy and technology intensive industries,
whereas the initial focus of ESAEs had been on
relatively labour-intensive industries. Machinery
and transport equipment, which represents a
fairly sophisticated industry, accounted for
about 10 per cent of manufacturing value added
in Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand in the
early 1970s; its share was twice to three times as
high in Poland, Hungary and former Czechoslo-
vakia.
2
9 Presumably, the industrial structure of
ESAEs was more in line with comparative ad-
vantages than in CEECs, which has helped the
former countries' favourable world-market per-
formance.
Second, the adjustment flexibility of ESAEs
has benefitted from a diversified economic struc-
ture, both in terms of ownership and scale of
enterprises. The responsiveness of producers and
investors to policy incentives in CEECs has been
impaired by the dominance of huge state-owned
industrial conglomerates, which frequently have
resisted reforms in general and privatization in
particular. The share of state-owned enterprises
in overall industrial employment typically ex-
ceeded 90 per cent in socialist times. Even in the
formerly centrally planned economies of Asia
such as China and Vietnam, this share was con-
siderably smaller (Raiser 1994; Diehl 1994).
Moreover, small and medium-scale enterprises
played a much greater role in the latter coun-
tries' industrial production (China: 49 per cent
in 1978). Because of competitive pressure, effi-
ciency gains were easier to achieve in Asia than
in CEECs where conglomerates, often employ-
ing the workforce of an entire region, had to be
broken up in the first place. The ownership and
scale characteristics prevailing in CEECs not
only imposed political barriers on structural ad-
justment, but also had detrimental effects on fac-
tor mobility during the early phases of transfor-
mation, as substantial resources may have been
blocked in one firm.
All in all, the impressive world-market per-
formance of ESAEs has been supported consid-
erably by fortuitous initial conditions, which
have increased the effectiveness of policy incen-
tives. A dynamic private sector existed from the
very beginning of catching-up, and fundamental
market-related institutions were in place as well.
In this respect, the starting conditions of CEECs
could not have been more different. The tradition
of entrepreneurial initiative and adaptation to
market signals had faded during decades of cen-
tral planning, and the sudden regime shift re-
sulted in an institutional void. The ensuing un-
certainty of economic agents made economic
policy formulation a rather daunting task for re-
formers in CEECs during the difficult transition
period. Under such unfavourable conditions, it
was not reasonable to expect that economic
agents would react to specific policy incentives30
as quickly and strongly as they had done in
ESAEs in the 1970s and 1980s.
II. EU and CEECs: Are They Natural
Trading Partners?
Empirical studies suggest that policy measures
intended to stimulate trade have less impact than
proximity factors under conditions of so-called
natural trading partnership. Natural trading
partners enjoy advantages of low transaction
costs due to geographical proximity, cultural
similarity and complementarity in resource en-
dowment.
3
0 So-called gravity models reveal, for
instance, that for each doubling of distance,
trade between two countries of similar size di-
minishes by two-thirds. A common border be-
tween two countries tends to increase trade by a
factor of 2.5. Short distance, the same language
and other bridging factors "explain" why, for in-
stance, Austrian exports to Germany are more
than thirty times larger (per dollar GNP of the
recipient) than its exports to the United States
(Pohl and Sorsa 1992: 89).
Yet, proximity cannot substitute for liberal
trade policies as demonstrated by Albania,
North Korea and Burma, for example, which do
not trade intensively with neighbouring countries
because of deliberate isolation. Nor can it sub-
stitute for sufficiently high per capita income as
small (official) trade between neighbouring low-
income African countries suggests. Natural
trading partnerships to become effective requires
liberal trade policies on both sides and absorp-
tive capacity. If such prerequisites are given, it
is argued that natural trading partnerships are
not at the expense of third countries. Rather,
marginal domestic suppliers will lose market
shares when imports from the partner countries
expand. Technically speaking, trade creation is
expected to be much larger than trade diversion,
so that world welfare will benefit.
Interestingly enough, the earlier experience of
ESAEs does not offer much support for the
natural trading partnership hypothesis. Cluster
analyses show some subregional "cells" of in-
tensive trading in the 1970s, for instance, be-
tween Malaysia and Singapore; Hong Kong and
China; and Indonesia and Japan. For most Asian
countries, however, the United States re-
presented the most important trading partner
(Amelung 1992: Figures 1 and 2). Japanese ab-
sorption of finished goods exported by neigh-
bouring Asian countries remained low for quite
some time, and the economic isolation of China
hindered natural trading partnerships from be-
coming effective. Moreover, intra-industry trade
among neighbouring Asian countries emerged
only with the rise of per capita income. It helped
to diffuse protectionist threats that had ham-
pered inter-industry trade. Intra-East Asian trade
started to grow overproportionately in the early
1980s, after China had begun to open its market
and ASEAN countries, Taiwan and Korea had
dismantled non-tariff barriers. In other words,
liberalization was a precondition for proximity
factors to stimulate bilateral trade among Asian
economies.
Likewise, natural trading partnership between
CEECs and West European neighbours could be
realized only after the former had embarked on
liberalization. In the socialist era, CEECs were
largely decoupled from world markets while
trading intensively with each other. The degree
to which the administered division of labour
within the former CMEA had failed to exploit
opportunities for trade with Western countries
has been assessed in a number of studies.
3
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Gravity models with "size" (GNP and popula-
tion of trading partners) and "trade resistance"
(distance, adjacency, trade policies) as the two
principal sets of explanatory variables revealed
that under ,,normal" conditions CEECs would
have exported several times as much to OECD
countries as they actually did. Wang and
Winters (1991), for instance, estimated that the
exports of six CEECs to the EU could have been
five times higher in 1985. A similarly large dis-
crepancy between hypothetical and actual trade
is revealed for CEECs' imports from the EU.
Correspondingly, intra-CEEC trade would have
been sharply redressed and would have
amounted to only 27 per cent of total trade, in-
stead of actually 67 per cent in 1985.
Which role the EU is expected to play in
CEECs' trade in the future, relative to other
OECD countries, depends on the importance of31
distance as a trade resisting factor. Various
models differ considerably in this respect.
Havrylyshyn and Pritchett (1991) as well as
Collins and Rodrik (1991) show larger negative
effects of distance on trade than Wang and
Winters (1991). As a result, remote trading
partners (such as Japan and the US) account for
a relatively low share in CEECs' exports in the
former studies. According to Collins and Rodrik
(1991:129-134), the EU-12 share in bilateral
trade flows with CEECs amounts to 50 per cent
(except for Hungary). EU shares estimated by
Wang and Winters (1991: 26) are in the range of
25-35 per cent (except for the former CSFR, the
share of which exceeds 40 per cent). The largest
concentration on EU markets is found by
Havrylyshyn and Pritchett (1991): CEECs in to-
tal (excluding the former USSR and East Ger-
many) would direct almost three quarters of
their exports to Western Europe; the former
CSFR would top the country ranking with 90
per cent, while Bulgaria would be at the lower
end with 42 per cent.
German unification is not taken into account
in the models, and they do not assume full EU
membership of CEECs. The impact of unifi-
cation is not difficult to predict. According to the
logic of gravity analyses, both the size effect and
the effects arising from distance and adjacency
are strengthened. Hence, German unification
further increases the EU weight in CEECs'
trade. Likewise, further institutional deepening
of bilateral trade relations might have an addi-
tional effect on EU trade shares. The impact of
closer integration may remain rather small, how-
ever, since the empirical results suggest most of
CEECs' trade to be conducted with the EU any-
how (Pohl and Sorsa 1992: 89).
It is somewhat difficult to assess the relevance
of geographical proximity in EU-CEEC trade
by confronting the model predictions with actual
trade patterns as they have developed since
1989. Actual developments reflect both
proximity factors and changes in EU trade poli-
cies vis-a-vis CEECs. It appears, however, that
models in which distance effects alone account
for very high EU shares tend to underrate the
impact of trade policy changes. EU shares in to-
tal CEECs' exports have risen gradually, paral-
lel to EU trade liberalization under the Asso-
ciation Agreements. The EU share turns out to
be highest for Polish exports, for which it
reached 63 per cent in 1993. The Czech Repub-
lic exhibited a much lower EU share in its 1993
exports than the former CSFR, which is due to
the separation of the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics and the importance of bilateral relations now
registered as external trade. The separation was
not captured by the models, which show the
former CSFR as the most strongly EU-oriented
country among the CEECs. Including trade with
those EFTA countries which became full EU
member states in 1995, the enlarged EU share in
CEECs' exports now exceeds 70 per cent for
Poland, 60 per cent for Hungary and 50 per cent
for the Czech Republic.
3
2 The rest of trade is
largely accounted for by trade among CEECs
and exports to developing countries.
Strategies towards full membership as con-
cluded at the Essen Summit
3
3 may further add
to the orientation of CEECs' exports towards
the EU in an enlarged community of more than
twenty member states. Yet, the more important
impact of EU accession on CEECs' welfare may
arise from more openness of CEECs in general.
Accession will contribute to dismantling the re-
maining trade barriers of CEECs (see Section
CIV). This would not only intensify trade with
the EU. At the same time, the trade between
CEECs would be stimulated because rules of
origin under the Visegrad co-operation, and the
trade between the Visegrad countries and Bul-
garia and Romania would become more multi-
lateral than bilateral.
In sum, recent trade developments, notably
the rapid reorientation of CEECs' exports to-
wards the EU support the proposition that a
natural trading partnership exists. Trade pat-
terns that had prevailed in the inter-war period
have been revitalized after the collapse of the
socialist regime. Complementarity in resource
endowment, low transaction costs and the ab-
sorptive capacity of EU markets are major
forces driving EU-CEEC trade. The role of
complementarities would be even larger if the
CAP were substantially reformed and CEECs
were allowed to fully realize cost advantages in
agricultural production.32
III. Competition between CEECs and
Asia in EU Markets
The extent to which CEECs may benefit from
natural trading partnership with the EU depends
not only on EU trade policy. Access to EU mar-
kets is also a function of the strength of actual or
potential competitors in the market. In this con-
text, particular attention needs to be paid to the
position of producers from developing or newly
industrializing countries in Asia. Their tech-
nological sophistication and unit labour costs are
broadly similar to that in CEECs.
3
4 It is there-
fore conceivable that suppliers from the two
country groups will compete with similar in-
dustries and products on EU markets. In this
case, firms from CEECs might face an uphill
struggle because they might still be handicapped
due to their decade-long isolation from the world
market. Asian firms, on the other hand, might al-
ready have well-established supply networks and
might have realized productivity improvements
through learning by doing.
The possible extent of such rivalry between
firms from the two regions in the EU market
may be gauged from so-called trade overlap
ratios presented in Table 10. This indicator
measures the similarity of the commodity com-
Table 10- Trade Overlaps: Central and Eastern Europe











































aDefinition of indicator: see text. Figures are based on 4-digit
commodity groupings of the Harmonised System (HS). Asian
countries include Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the
Philippines, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea.
Figures for intervening years are not reported because the trade
overlaps increase gradually without significant fluctuations.—
bl992.
Source: Eurostat (various issues), own calculations.
positions of EU imports from two countries or
country groups.
3
5 In interpreting the trade
overlap indicator it must be borne in mind that
the figures are sensitive about the degree to
which the commodity groups are aggregated
(Kellman and Schroder 1983). It is therefore
difficult to give meaning to the absolute value of
the indicator. Comparisons are appropriate,
however, over time as well as across CEECs.
Table 10 demonstrates that the export struc-
ture of CEECs have unequivocally become more
similar to those of ESAEs since economic trans-
formation started in the former countries in
1989. This finding applies to food as well as to
non-food products, and also to every single
transition economy.
3
6 It must be concluded,
therefore, that as CEECs integrate into the world
economy, they will increasingly have to face up
to competition from Asian countries. Since the
trade overlap ratios for the individual CEECs do
not differ widely, this finding relates to all coun-
tries to a similar degree.
It is difficult to draw conclusions from this
evidence as to how strongly competition from
Asia will affect the prospects for market entry
by Central or East European producers. Several
considerations apply. First, the trade overlap
indicator relates to ESAEs being on widely di-
verging levels of economic development, all of
which are experiencing rapid economic growth
and rising real wages. They are therefore under
constant pressure to upgrade their exports, both
in terms of product quality and in terms of
moving towards more sophisticated products
('flying geese' pattern). Under these conditions,
firms from CEECs probably have better pros-
pects of entering markets than they would have
in the presence of entrenched competitors ex-
periencing little structural change.
Second, CEECs enjoy a competitive ad-
vantage over Asian countries in the West Euro-
pean market in terms of geographic and cultural
proximity as well as preferential market access
(see Section C.II). Preferential access is granted
by the EU on the basis of the Europe Agree-
ments. It involves successive and accelerated re-
ductions in tariffs and quantitative restrictions33
for most industrial goods, leading to the eventual
abolition of trade barriers by the end of the cur-
rent decade. Such preferences matter particu-
larly in quota-restricted items. Restrictions on
EU imports of agricultural products from
CEECs are also scheduled to be reduced, albeit
at lower speed and over a longer time horizon.
With respect to cultural and geographic prox-
imity, it may be noted that CEECs' exports of
many intermediate industrial goods as well as
exports after processing benefit from frequent
head-to-head contacts with customers, which are
facilitated by proximity to the West European
market. It is likely that CEECs will tend to




Third, it has been suspected that demand con-
straints could limit the growth of exports from
developing to industrialized countries, especially
if a large number of developing countries em-
barked simultaneously on a strategy of export-
oriented development (the so-called "fallacy of
composition" argument). If true, this would call
into question the applicability of the "East Asian
model" of world-market orientation to other re-
gions, including Central and Eastern Europe.
3
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Demand constraints may take the form of pro-
tectionism by industrialized countries when im-
ports from lower-wage economies exceed some
politically acceptable level. From the point of
view of CEECs, this fear would seem to have
been contained by the strong commitment made
by the EU in the Europe Agreements and the
post-Essen "pre-accession strategy" (PAS) to-
wards the reduction of tariffs and contingent
protection affecting imports from CEECs.
More importantly perhaps, if a large number
of countries simultaneously increase their export
supply of a similar range of products, the world
market prices of these goods will tend to fall.
Unless the import prices of the countries con-
cerned are equally reduced, their net barter terms
of trade are bound to deteriorate. Several con-
siderations suggest, however, that the net wel-
fare effects of the opening of their economies
will still tend to be positive.
3
9 Economic liber-
alization and the build-up of technological ca-
pability start from different levels and proceed
gradually, because the policy regime and stage
of economic development vary considerably
among the developing and transition economies
in question. Even if various countries implement
far-reaching policy reforms simultaneously, they
may specialize in different product groups. Each
country's terms of trade will therefore dete-
riorate by less than would be suggested by a
mechanistic application of the export patterns of
the four Asian 'tigers' to the rest of the develop-
ing world or to the transition economies. For ex-
ample, manufactured exports will continue to
play a smaller role in many resource-rich Asian
countries than in the resource-poor NIEs.
In the medium term, the more advanced de-
veloping and transition economies will increas-
ingly become efficient exporters of relatively
sophisticated products, including capital goods,
which constitute a large share of the imports of
less advanced developing and transition econ-
omies. A growing share of their total exports
will hence be directed towards newly emerging
markets, rather than to traditional markets in in-
dustrialized countries. This trend will be inten-
sified to the extent to which exporters from de-
veloping or transition economies are able to
supply product varieties which are particularly
appropriate for local conditions, especially local
relative factor prices. The resulting decline of
the world market prices of relatively sophisti-
cated goods will benefit the net importers of
such products among the developing and tran-
sition countries.
In sum, there is no reason to downplay the
competitive pressure faced by CEECs as they
increase their exports to West European markets
where ESAEs have already settled as important
suppliers. However, neither competitive pressure
nor unfavourable demand conditions are likely to
constitute an insurmountable obstacle to their
integration into Western European or other
OECD markets. This conclusion is supported by
their rapid success in raising their shares in EU
imports in spite of fierce competition from China
and other fast-growing Asian exporters of manu-
factures.34
IV. Policy-Specific Conditions in
CEECs
Previous sections in this study have shown that
East Asia's export success has been facilitated
by various factors:
- Catching-up processes started from low in-
come levels. ESAEs did not face the painful
experience of CEECs, which had to cope with
an obsolete capital stock and suffered from
declining production in the initial phase of
economic transformation.
- Export growth was achieved in a relatively
open trading environment. Unlike CEECs,
ESAEs had not to deal with the legacy of
having been cut off from natural trading part-
ners by almost half a century.
- ESAEs were export forerunners in a large
number of manufacturing industries at times
of high world economic growth. Late-coming
CEECs had to enter OECD markets when
demand was more sluggish than in the 1960s
and 1970s and when EU markets were al-
ready penetrated by Asian exporters. Trade
overlap estimates suggest that CEECs have to
face the competition of established suppliers
from ESAEs, since the specialization profiles
of the two country groups have tended to con-
verge slowly.
In addition to differences related to more or
less exogenous factors, the applicability of the
Asian path to world market integration to
CEECs may be debated on economic policy
grounds as well. As concerns the external poli-
cies of ESAEs, national sovereignty in policy-
making remained untouched. Regional commit-
ments were not taken, and multilateral trade lib-
eralization was applied but not accepted as
binding. Until the Uruguay Round (UR), many
Asian countries shied away from bound tariff
rates, membership in various GATT codes and
other international rules designed for strength-
ening discipline. They preferred unilateral over
multilateral liberalization in order to maintain
scope for policy manoeuvring.
CEECs have been in a different position and,
consequently, have chosen the opposite option.
They had to deal with institution building, mone-
tary stabilization and real adjustment at the
same time. Given this demanding policy agenda
and the lack of experience in implementing mar-
ket-related reforms, the risk of policy reversal
and volatility was fairly high at the beginning of
economic transformation. Governments in
CEECs attempted to minimize such risks by
tying their own hands as far as external policies
were concerned. In other words, they accepted
international commitments by way of acceding
to supranational bodies and multilateral treaties.
The approach of CEECs consists of three
major elements, which will be analyzed in the
subsequent sections. First, CEECs liberalize
multilaterally in the GATT/WTO framework.
While Bulgaria was still negotiating with the
WTO on accession by early 1995, four CEECs
have already been WTO member states and
Poland has been in the stage of domestic rati-
fication of WTO membership. GATT/WTO
membership implies full implementation of
liberalization measures concluded in the UR.
Hence, it can be regarded as the most far-
reaching step of opening goods markets. Second,
regional integration will be pursued between the
Visegrad countries, as well as between the
Visegrad countries and Bulgaria/Romania.
Third, the CEECs are in a process of acceding
to the EU, with the Europe Agreements and the
PAS as the two institutional pillars. Accelerating
trade liberalization by both sides, with the EU
proceeding first, aims at achieving a bilateral
free trade area ten years after the first liberali-
zation steps were launched in spring 1992. Full
EU membership has implications far beyond
trade-related policies, however. Notably the
"acquis communautaire" has to be met by
CEECs. This involves the adjustment of their
entire institutional framework to the EU legal
system concerning, for instance, subsidies, com-
petition rules, indirect taxation, commercial laws
and banking regulations.
1. CEECs' Policy Measures within the
GATT/WTO Framework
Except for Bulgaria, all CEECs have actively
participated in the UR. Contributions comprised35
the following quantitative commitments, inter
alia:
(i) Visegrad countries will reduce tariffs on in-
dustrial products by 30 per cent from 8.6 to 6.0
per cent (Table 11). Poland tops the ranking in
terms of percentage reduction (38 per cent), but
still has the highest tariff level after the UR. The
Czech and Slovak Republics display the lowest
tariff level(both before and after the UR), com-
ing close to that of the EU. Hungary has some-
what decoupled from the EU tariff because its
tariff cuts are lower than those of the EU (28
per cent against 37 per cent). Hence, tariff dif-
ferentials between Hungary and the EU has be-
come larger. Romania sharply deviates from the
Visegrad pattern because it has preferred tariff
binding over tariff reductions. As a result,
Romanian post-UR bound rates are on average
higher than the applied rates before. Notwith-
standing the significance of tariff binding for
more transparency and credibility, tariff pro-
tection continues to play a much larger role in
Romania than in the Visegrad countries. Fur-
thermore, in contrast to Visegrad countries,
Romania is still treated as a developing country
so that it may invoke the GATT/WTO clause on
"special and differential treatment". Bulgaria's
status is the most uncertain one among the
CEECs but its tariff structure resembles more
the Romanian than the Visegrad one.






































aPre- and post-Uruguay round tariff averages are computed as the
weighted average of tariff rates on >ound lines ancI applied tariff
rates on unbound lines. — ''Binding of ceilings more than offsets
tariff reductions.
Source: GATT (1994a: Appendix Tables 5 and 7).
For the accession strategy, the following con-
clusions can be drawn from the GATT/WTO
tariff commitments of the CEECs. First, pref-
erential effects of the six bilateral EU-CEEC
Free Trade Agreements will be reduced once the
multilateral commitments are implemented. It
follows that trade diversion feared by third coun-
tries will become less likely. Second, remaining
tariff differentials between CEECs and the EU,
and between the individual CEECs suggest diffi-
culties to arise if a customs union with the EU is
aimed at for all CEECs simultaneously. By de-
scending order, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary
might require longer transition periods on the
way to a customs union than the other three
countries. Third, integration between the in-
dividual Visegrad countries and between this
region and Bulgaria/Romania is impeded if
tariffs are dismantled more slowly in CEECs
with the highest initial tariff protection. From
the EU perspective, trade integration seems to be
easiest with the Czech Republic and most diffi-
cult with Romania and Bulgaria,
(ii) Like all major OECD countries, Visegrad
countries and Romania agreed to cut export
subsidies for agricultural products. The normal
target rate is in the range of 24 per cent
(Romania) and 36 per cent (Visegrad countries)
for the total of subsidized agricultural products.
However, rates of reduction vary widely by
products (GATT 1994a: Appendix Table 12).
(iii) Parallel to other Contracting Parties
(including the EU), the Visegrad countries of-
fered to reduce domestic support to agricultural
producers (by 20 per cent) (see GATT 1994:
Appendix Table 13). They have thus accom-
panied EU reforms of the CAP by own meas-
ures.
(iv) Finally, CEECs have committed themselves
to inscribe in those service activities which be-
come subject to market access and national
treatment under the GATS (positive list for sec-
toral coverage), and to notify restrictions to be
maintained for these activities (negative or ex-
clusion list). This signals that CEECs are pre-
pared to dismantle trade barriers in services at a
much earlier stage of economic development36
than many other Contracting Parties. The
CEECs' commitments facilitate the accession to
the internal market, considering that the 1992
programme focuses strongly on services. The
number of service activities for which commit-
ments are made is smaller for Romania (45) than
for the Visegrad countries (Czech and Slovak
Republics: 81 and 82, respectively; Hungary:
89; Poland: 54).
In sum, Visegrad countries seem visibly ad-
vanced relative to the two other CEECs, both in
terms of coverage and depth of multilaterally
concluded liberalization measures. Compared
with the ESAEs, the Visegrad countries have
relied more on binding measures. The share of
industrial imports subject to bound rates was al-
ready fairly high before the UR in Visegrad
countries (74 per cent compared with only 10
per cent on average for the ESAEs). This share
will increase to 96 per cent after the UR
(ESAEs: 70 per cent). Romania will approach
the Visegrad level, since it has increased the
share of imports subject to bound rates from 10
per cent in the pre-UR period to 100 per cent. In
short, ESAEs have applied relatively low tariff
rates but refused to guarantee them in a legally
binding way until recently. By contrast, CEECs
have guaranteed the level of liberalization
achieved by the end of the UR to almost 100 per
cent.
2. Integration and Co-operation among
CEECs
Policy-specific conditions in CEECs differ from
those in ESAEs with respect to regional inte-
gration and co-operation as well. This is not to
say that co-operation does not exist among
ESAEs. However, it is very much driven by the
private sector with few public interventions only
(for instance, so-called growth triangles to facili-
tate border trade and capital flows; see also
Section II.C). Again, CEECs are in a different
position. For accession to the EU, it is useful to
remove barriers to trade and capital flows be-
tween each other. Such liberalization would be
indispensable if the countries wanted to accede
simultaneously. By contrast, a "convoy" ap-
proach with the most "mature" economy enter-
ing first and the other countries following step
by step would allow to postpone the removal of
trade barriers between CEECs until latecomers
join the EU. However, the more liberalization
schedules differ between EU-CEEC trade on the
one hand and intra-CEEC trade on the other
hand, the more likely is trade diversion to the
detriment of CEEC suppliers. The liberalization
of CEECs' imports from the EU may render
such imports cheaper than still restricted imports
from other CEECs, even though production
costs are lower in CEECs than in the EU.
Hence, CEEC suppliers may lose neighbouring
markets to EU competitors.
Since the collapse of CMEA, economic inter-
dependence among CEECs has been much lower
than between CEECs and the EU. Table 12 re-
veals that intra-regional trade shares did not ex-
ceed 8 per cent in 1993, except for trade within
the former CSFR. Gravity models predict that
intra-CEEC trade — exemplified by intra-
Visegrad trade — would actually expand due to
mutual free trade arrangements (ECE 1993).
The estimates suggest that Poland's exports to
Hungary could grow to more than three times
the 1991 level. Hungary would triple its exports
to Poland and double its exports to the former
CSFR. Such increases would bring intra-CEEC
trade close to former CMEA trade shares in
1985.
























Source: IMF Direction of Trade 1994 Yearbook.
Yet, the role of mutual free trade arrange-
ments should not be overrated. Full membership
in the EU is clearly the dominating concern of
CEECs. Moreover, the experience of ESAEs37
suggests that intra-regional trade may expand
without preferences if high income growth gives
rise to intra-industry trade. The bulk of external
trade of ESAEs has always been accounted for
by OECD countries, however. The same is likely
to hold for CEECs.
This may explain why initiatives to deepen in-
tegration between the individual Visegrad coun-
tries and between this group and Bulgaria/
Romania are not strongly rooted in the countries
themselves. Rather, they originate from the EU
side. CEECs regard themselves as competing
units rather than as congenial partners which
would enjoy better collective bargaining power
vis-a-vis the EU. EU initiatives for subregional
integration are interpreted as "diversion tactics"
(Richter 1994: 22). Politically, the drive for
early accession may be slowed down in this way.
Economically, the EU may be interested in
having a larger part of CEECs' exports ab-
sorbed by other markets than the EU in order to
reduce its own adjustment needs. For a number
of reasons, however, it may be favourable for
both the EU and CEECs to link the accession to
the EU with improvements in dismantling trade
barriers among all CEECs. First, rules of origin
have to be maintained and strictly controlled as
long as partner countries in a free trade ar-
rangement apply different levels of external pro-
tection against third countries. Rules of origin
are essential in order to ensure the effectiveness
of tariff discrimination between beneficiaries
and non-beneficiaries and discourage trade de-
flection, i.e., imports into high-tariff countries
via low-tariff countries. They are costly to ad-
minister, however. Administrative costs can be
reduced to the extent that tariff discrimination is
overcome. Second, the sourcing of inputs from
partner countries will become more efficient if
trade barriers between CEECs are dismantled.
Sourcing from donor suppliers is encouraged by
"donor country content" rules (cumulation of
value added originating from donors and local
value added). Cumulation of value-added com-
ponents originating from the producing CEEC,
the CEEC partner country and the EU play an
important role in the PAS. It creates incentives
to trade expansion among CEECs using EU in-
puts. Various stages of cumulation have been
designed.
4
0 The PAS aims at gradually moving
through the different stages. Stages achieved so
far are asymmetrical as they are more advanced
for EU-Visegrad relations (diagonal cumu-
lation) than for EU-Bulgaria or EU-Romania
relations (bilateral cumulation). Hence, diagonal
cumulation is to be extended to Bulgaria and
Romania. This requires negotiations between
the Visegrad group and the two countries, as
well as between Bulgaria and Romania on re-
moving trade barriers and on harmonization of
customs valuation and other trade-related policy
measures. More advanced stages of cumulation
(i.e., European cumulation and full cumulation)
are conditioned by the success to reach diagonal
cumulation.
The PAS links accession to the EU with intra-
CEEC integration and co-operation. The EU
contributed to the aims of the PAS by accel-
erating tariff cuts, liberalizing anti-dumping
procedures, setting in force the Interim Agree-
ments and launching the Association Agree-
ments for four CEECs (Czech and Slovak Re-
publics, Bulgaria, Romania) in February 1995.
The CEECs reciprocated by intensifying their
integration and co-operation in various steps:
- In December 1992, the Visegrad countries
concluded the Central European Free Trade
Agreement (CEFTA) heading for a free trade
area by 2001. In 1994, CEFTA liberalization
schedules were revised in order to accelerate
the removal of trade barriers. Accordingly,
the free trade status for most industrial prod-




- With the beginning of 1996, tariffs on agri-
cultural products in intra-Visegrad trade will
be lowered by 50 per cent. Two years later,
such tariffs will be removed completely.
- Slovenia is a candidate for entering the
CEFTA after having negotiated three bilateral
agreements with Hungary, the Czech Repub-
lic and the Slovak Republic. It agreed to
comply with tariff reductions of CEFTA, and
to conclude bilateral agreements on mutual
recognition of phytosanitary and veterinary
certificates by July 1995.38
All in all, endeavours on the CEEC side to
comply with the EU incentives for deepening in-
tegration reveal a clear asymmetry. Intra-
CEFTA integration proceeds and will be ex-
tended to Slovenia. The institutional links be-
tween CEFTA and Bulgaria/Romania, and be-
tween the two latter states are still very much
weaker. This coincides with similar gaps be-
tween Visegrad countries and the two other
CEECs with regard to multilateral commit-
ments.
3. CEECs' Implementation of the Europe
Agreements
It is stated in the Europe Agreements that the
major precondition for CEECs' economic inte-
gration into the Community is that existing and
future legislation will be more in line with that
of the Community. Chapter III of the individual
Agreements lists various areas such as rules on
competition, indirect taxation, banking laws,
company accounts, intellectual property stan-
dards, environment and consumer protection.
Given the almost complete lack of market-ori-
ented institutions under the socialist system,
harmonisation with EU standards will not only
be essential to meet the requirements of the
"acquis communautaire". Legislative institution
building is also indispensable for preserving
macroeconomic stability and tightening budget
constraints, for instance, through applying bank-
ruptcy laws and preventing the state from ex-
cessive subsidization of loss-making companies.
Furthermore, it will be instrumental to attract
foreign investment and to minimize the risk of
being exposed to contingent protection (e.g.,
safeguards, countervailing duties and anti-
dumping procedures).
The progress achieved so far with respect to
institution building differs between CEECs,
notably between the Visegrad countries on the
one hand and Bulgaria/Romania on the other
hand. The Czech Republic appears to be fairly
advanced, for example. Domestic prices and
foreign trade were liberalized early in the trans-
formation process. Convertibility for current ac-
count transactions was introduced timely.
Voucher privatization was implemented in two
major stages, thereby transferring about 90 per
cent of the capital stock into private ownership.
The tax and social insurance systems were ad-
justed to EU standards, and legal prerequisites
(insolvency law) for decentralized decision-
making were fulfilled. Efficient macroeconomic
management by credible public institutions
helped to keep inflation and unemployment at
bay. Moreover, restrictions on capital trans-
actions were dismantled. It was announced that
convertibility was to be extended to capital
transactions, and restrictions for exporters to
surrender hard currency earnings to the Central
Bank were to be lifted.
How widely achievements in institution
building differ among CEECs is exemplified by
the case of Romania. Handicapped by lack of
political consensus and guidance, progress in
privatizing state-owned industrial enterprises
and banks was limited. Bankruptcy laws could
not be enforced against vested interests. Impor-
tant legal requirements for efficient financial
markets (e.g., stock exchange operations) were
delayed, which hindered the mobilization of
domestic equity capital. The lack of credible in-
stitutions rendered it difficult to contain in-
flationary pressures. Relatively liberal invest-
ment laws, allowing foreigners to invest in all
major sectors, remained largely ineffective be-
cause of uncertainty arising from high and
volatile inflation. Moreover, access of non-resi-
dents to real estate is still very much impeded.
The degree of institution building achieved in
other CEECs typically ranges between these two
country cases. A detailed discussion would go
beyond the scope of this study. Yet, in-depth
analyses (Buch et al. 1994: 30-37) point to the
crucial importance of financial market reforms
for overcoming the institutional void after the
collapse of the socialist regime. Financial in-
stitution building requires, inter alia: introducing
a two-tier banking system, releasing commercial
banks from inherited bad debts, removing the
bias in credit allocation in favour of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), and recapitalizing and pri-
vatizing banks. Recent evidence suggests that
CEECs which have made significant progress in
these respects were among the first to benefit
from the trade options of the Europe Agree-39
ments. It fits into this picture, for example, that
export expansion was sustained in the case of
the Czech Republic.
The implementation of institutional reforms is
a major challenge to domestic policies, rather
than being a field in which external financial as-
sistance has an important role to play. Indirect
support and technical assistance of partner
countries may be helpful, however, and is ac-
tually an element of the PAS following the Essen
Summit. Guidance on the compatibility of state
aid and competition policies with EU regulations
is a case in point. It can help CEECs to stop
privileged credit allocation to loss-making SOEs
and to fight monopolistic enterprise behaviour.
Technical assistance in designing an appropriate
legal framework governing FDI may reduce the
costs of information between local and foreign
counterparts. Notably smaller FDI projects may
be attracted in this way. Furthermore, financial
institutions in CEECs may be linked more
closely to foreign institutions and data bases
(including rating and accounting agencies) if ex-
tended financing of telecom infrastructure is
provided through PHARE. Finally, companies in
CEECs may be advised on technicalities of ac-
countancy practices in the EU. This may help
implementing the announcement of the Essen
Summit to accept price undertakings of com-
panies allegedly dumping their exports, rather
than imposing anti-dumping duties.
Accession of CEECs to the "acquis com-
munautaire" is without precedent in ESAEs.
Frequent disputes with the US and the EU on
dumping, other "unfair" trade practices and
violation of intellectual property rights illustrate
that broadly based compliance with US or EU
legal standards was not attempted by ESAEs.
Only recently, they have given in somewhat to
external pressure. ESAEs reluctantly began to
endorse principles of harmonization of trading
rules during the UR.
All in all, policy-specific conditions shaping
the external economic relations of CEECs differ
in three respects from conditions prevailing in
ESAEs:
- From the very beginning of their transfor-
mation, CEECs aimed at becoming reliable
partners in a dense network of binding in-
stitutional commitments. Thereby, they at-
tempted to tie their own hands with regard to
external policies and to benefit from stable
access conditions for their exports. By con-
trast, ESAEs' approach to world markets
tended to be unilateral, non-negotiable and
discretionary.
- CEECs' main political target is full EU mem-
bership. This overriding concern is shaping
the entire spectrum of policy instruments in
the transformation process. The policies of
ESAEs were never oriented towards privi-
leged relations with one trading partner.
Rather, so-called dialogue partner systems
(e.g., operated by ASEAN with major OECD
countries) are deliberately balanced.
- Full EU membership is conditioned on the
removal of trade barriers among CEECs.
Hence, there is strong external pressure to
sub-regional integration, which ESAEs never
faced.
D. Summary and Policy Conclusions
Two related questions have been raised in this
study: (i) What lessons may Central and East
European countries (CEECs) draw from the ex-
perience of East and Southeast Asian economies
(ESAEs) with export promotion? (ii) Can the
Asian success in penetrating world markets be
repeated by CEECs pursuing Asian-like eco-
nomic policies? At first sight, these questions
may seem to be redundant. As a matter of fact,
many CEECs were quite successful in redirect-
ing exports towards Western markets after the
collapse of administered trade within the former
CMEA. Close institutional links to the EU and
the preferential treatment of CEECs' exports by
their "natural trading partner" provide favour-
able prospects for export growth to continue.40
Various considerations suggest, however, that
even a natural trading partnership with the EU
does not guarantee export expansion and diver-
sification on a sustainable basis. The most gen-
erous conditions for access to foreign markets
cannot substitute for consistent and stable do-
mestic policies. Asian governments are enjoying
strong reputation in this respect. By contrast,
CEECs had to start economic transformation
from scratch. Institutional prerequisites for a
market economy were largely absent, and gov-
ernments lacked experience in pursuing market-
related economic policies.
CEECs are still struggling with legacies of the
past such as distorted production structures, ob-
solete capital stocks and inherited non-perform-
ing debt. While some countries have made con-
siderable progress in overcoming internal bottle-
necks to income growth and trade expansion,
economic transformation has remained deficient
in other places. As a result, domestic and foreign
investors have adopted wait-and-see attitudes,
which hampers the recovery of production for
both local and foreign markets. All this suggests
that it is a more daunting task to achieve sus-
tainable growth of income and exports in
CEECs than in ESAEs, which initiated catching-
up processes from low income levels.
Access to Western markets is also a function
of the strength of actual or potential competitors.
In this respect, too, CEECs are facing an uphill
struggle. First, they are still handicapped after
their decade-long isolation from world markets.
Second, ESAEs supplying a similar range of
products have established themselves as com-
petitive frontrunners. Third, demand in OECD
markets has become more sluggish than in the
1960s and 1970s.
The significantly different starting conditions
suggest that, in the short run at least, the Asian
success in penetrating world markets is not
easily to be repeated by CEECs, notwithstanding
their privileged relations with the EU. Further-
more, economic transformation involves policy
challenges going beyond the Asian experience in
export promotion. Notably the latecomers
among CEECs have to deal with institution
building, macroeconomic stabilization and real
adjustment (including large-scale privatization)
at the same time. Unless reforms in these areas
are firmly rooted and can be regarded as ir-
reversible, uncertainty with respect to future in-
vestment conditions will remain high. Con-
sequently, the effectiveness of specific policy
measures such as export incentives is likely to
be limited.
It follows that policy options available to well
reputated Asian governments could not rea-
sonably be taken by CEECs in the early phases
of economic transformation. This applies to the
ESAEs' preference of maintaining national sov-
ereignty in trade-related policies in the first
place. If CEECs had followed the Asian way of
unilateral and discretionary liberalization, pro-
ducers and investors would have been subjected
to further uncertainties during the difficult tran-
sition period. To contain uncertainty, CEECs
had no alternative but to take the opposite option
of tying their own hands and reducing the scope
for policy manoeuvring. Hence, they committed
themselves to multilaterally binding liberali-
zation by actively participating in the Uruguay
Round. Though reluctantly, CEECs complied
with EU demands for institutionalized inte-
gration and co-operation among themselves, in
order to improve the prospects for accession to
the EU. Finally, and most importantly, CEECs
agreed to meet the requirements of the "acquis
communautaire", which extend well beyond
trade-related policies. In other words, CEECs
had to import credibility and, thereby, com-
pensate for institutional deficiencies and the lack
of reputation after the demise of the socialist
regime.
The strategy of tying one's own hands con-
strains by definition the possibilities of CEECs
to draw on Asian experiences when designing
export promotion programmes. Tariff schedules
consist of bound rates almost exclusively since
the completion of the Uruguay Round, so that
discretion with regard to tariff protection is no
longer possible. WTO membership involves ad-
herence to codified rules on various trade-related
policy instruments. Notably subsidies are to be
phased out as an export incentive, while many
ESAEs had applied this instrument in the early
stages of export-orientation. Likewise, the
Europe Agreements include regulations on state41
aid, etc., which effectively bind the CEECs.
Compliance with the "acquis communautaire"
will further reduce discretion (e.g., with respect
to indirect taxation and competition policy),
which ESAEs made frequent use of.
Nevertheless, the Asian experience does offer
some important lessons on the appropriate de-
sign of export promotion programmes:
First, specific export incentives should be com-
plementary and require sound macroeconomic
policies to be effective. Furthermore, the success
of export promotion depends on the availability
of essential infrastructure (including legal pro-
visions for enforcing contracts).
Second, exporters should have unrestricted ac-
cess to domestic and imported inputs. The policy
regime must aim at a balanced incentive system.
This means that any implicit taxation of export
activities resulting from import substitution
policies must be compensated. This can be
achieved through duty drawback or exemption
schemes.
Third, export processing zones may be estab-
lished to assure a free trade status for export
producers, until imports are largely liberalized.
However, the effectiveness of such zones is
limited at best if they cannot exert competitive
pressure on the rest of the economy, neither by
sourcing nor by final output.
Fourth, export promotion measures should be
granted on a temporary basis. This helps con-
taining costs which may overstrain governments
struggling with fiscal problems anyway (as in
some CEECs). Moreover, phasing-out support
on a pre-determined schedule creates incentives
to improve productivity and, thereby, become
competitive by world market standards. Overall,
the Asian experience suggests that government
interventions must encourage, rather than im-
pede structural change.
Fifth, foreign direct investment (FDI) may con-
tribute significantly to export growth. It should
be kept in mind, however, that FDI inflows de-
pend on favourable growth prospects and
macroeconomic stability, rather than costly
promotion measures in the form of tax privileges
and other subsidies.
Finally, institutional support can be helpful in
reducing the costs of information of local pro-
ducers and foreign importers. Officially spon-
sored institutions should focus their activities on
assisting the marketing of smaller and new-
coming exporters.
The EU has made significant contributions to
increase the effectiveness of trade policy reforms
in CEECs, notably by granting privileged mar-
ket access according to the Europe Agreements
and by accelerating trade liberalization in the
context of the pre-accession strategy. Yet, there
is further scope for external support. This ap-
plies to agriculture in the first place. Progress in
reforming the CAP would enable CEECs to
make full use of their comparative advantage in
agricultural production and to have undistorted
access to international input markets. Moreover,
the EU should refrain from contingent protec-
tion, in order to reduce uncertainty of CEEC ex-
porters under which conditions goods and
services are allowed to enter EU markets:
Compliance of the EU with multilateral rules on
dispute settlement, anti-dumping procedures,
etc., would be an important step to prevent the
EU from using its superior collective bargaining
power as a leverage.
The risk of serious trade conflicts between
CEECs and the EU may be somewhat reduced
through technical assistance. Advising CEEC
companies on technicalities of accountancy
practices in the EU is a case in point. Likewise,
CEECs may be assisted in setting up guidelines
on state aid and competition rules that are com-
patible with EU provisions. Technical assistance
is also useful in designing an appropriate legal
framework governing FDI, and in establishing
institutions that may help to reduce the costs of
information of local producers and foreign coun-
terparts. Financial assistance has a relatively
small role to play in this context. It should be
directed towards infrastructure needed to further
improve the links of CEECs with Western mar-
kets. Communication and transportation facili-
ties are critically important in this respect as
demonstrated by serious bottlenecks at EU-
CEEC customs borders.42
Endnotes
The section on Hong Kong draws on GATT (1994b) for a great part of factual information 1
2 The section on Indonesia is based on GATT (1991, Vol. I; 1995, Vol. I) and Pangestu (1992).
3 For a detailed analysis of earlier trade and exchange rate policies see Pitt (1991), who has listed various changes in
import entitlement schemes (Bonus Ekspor) from the 1950s to the 1970s.
4 For statistical references on Malaysia see GATT (1993b, Vol. I).
5 The following analysis draws on GATT (1992b, Vol. I), Kihwan and Lee (1994) and Kim (1991).
" Statistical and other factual information on Singapore is taken from GATT (1992a; 1994a) unless otherwise
mentioned. See also Aw (1991).
7 The section on the Philippines draws on GATT (1993a, Vol. I and II) as well as Shepherd and Alburo (1991).
8 For more details than given here see GATT (1991a, Vol. II).
9 The section on Taiwan draws on Linnemann et al. (1987), Wu (1991) and Okuda (1994).
10 The section on technology transfer is based on World Bank (1993) and on the discussion initiated by this book,
especially several articles in the special issue of World Development April 1994 and Rodrik (1994).
*•*• Wortzel and Wortzel (1981) study the behaviour of locally owned exporting firms in five Asian countries in three
major export industries (consumer electronics, athletic footware, clothing). A detailed account of technology aquisition
by Korean enterprises is given by Enos and Park (1988).
1
2 The section on technological capability draws especially on Lucas (1993), Pack (1994) and Lau and Wan (1993).
" In many engineering applications, for example, a rule of thumb says that each doubling of cumulative output reduces
labour input to 60 per cent of its previous level.
1
4 For a comprehensive discussion, see Nunnenkamp et al. (1994).
1
5 On this point and related arguments, see ADB (1994), Agarwal (1994) and Riedel (1991).
1
6 For detailed analyses, see Langhammer (1995), Fukasaku (1992) and Riedel [(991).
1
7 Data mostly refer to 1992 and are from World Bank World Development Report (1994).
* The high share of textiles and clothing in Hong Kong's merchandise exports is largely due to entrepot trade, i.e.
Chinese exports flowing through Hong Kong.
For a more detailed analysis of intra-Asian trade, see the references given in footnote 16, and various issues of ADB
Asian Development Outlook.
2" See Section C.II for a discussion on "natural" trading partners in the European context.
Again, however, entrepot trade plays a role; South Korea and Taiwan direct much of their trade with the PR China
through Hong Kong (Riedel 1991).
2
2 For detailed calculations, see Fukasaku (1992) and Langhammer (1995).
2
3 Various articles in the Asian Development Review deal in substantial detail with intra-Asian FDI, e.g. Chen (1993),
Yue (1993), and Riedel (1991); see also various issues of ADB Asian Development Outlook.
2
4 See Langhammer (1995) and the sources given there.
2
5 For an account of major determinants, see ADB (1990) and Riedel (1991).
2
6 For details, see Langhammer (1995), Panagariya (1993: Table 4) and Riedel (1991); see also Section B.I.
2
7 See also Diehl (1994), Raiser (1994), and Sachs and Woo (1994).
2° For a detailed discussion, see Buch et al. (1994).
2
9 See various issues of World Bank World Development Report.
3
0 See Balassa and Bauwens (1989), Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), and Jacquemin and Sapir (1991).
3
1 See Collins and Rodrik (1991), Wang and Winters (1991), and Havrylyshyn and Pritchett (1991).
3
2 International trade statistics, quoted from Richter (1994: 31-33).
3
3 See EC Commission, Secretariat General, Document SI(94) 1000. 10 December 1994.
One recent estimate puts hourly labour costs for production workers in industry at between DM 1.34 and DM 4.54 in
the CEECs. The corresponding figures for China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand range from DM 0.65 to DM 2.66;
in the four NIEs hourly labour costs are between DM 7.45 and DM 9.92 (IWD-Informationsdienst des Instituts der
deutschen Wirtschaft, 2 March 1995).
It is calculated by first computing the percentage share of every product in total food or non-food EU imports from each
country. This gives two values (percentage shares), one from each country, for every product group. The index is
defined as the sum, over all food or non-food product groups, of the smaller of the two values (Finger and Kreinin
1979).43
3 Trade overlaps were also calculated for sub-regions (resource-rich ASEAN countries; more industrialized NIEs) and
for different aggregation levels. In essence, findings are similar to those presented in Table 10. Tables are available
upon request.
3
7 The importance of geographic and cultural proximity is exemplified by the fact that the average size of foreign
manufacturing firms with German direct investment increases considerably with the distance of the host country from
Germany. The average number of employees in 1992 was 167 for non-EU industrialized countries in Europe (including
German-speaking Austria and Switzerland), 210 for the EU, 291 for industrialized countries outside Europe, and 462
for non-OPEC developing countries. Unfortunately the data source combines the CEECs with other former centrally
planned economies (including China) and OPEC countries, so that no meaningful conclusions can be drawn for this
group (Deutsche Bundesbank 1994). It is plausible to presume that the smaller average size of investment projects in
Europe is indicative of a smaller average size of donor country firms. Hence proximity to Western Europe can be
expected to give CEECs a head start on tapping capital as well as technological and managerial resources from small
and medium-sized firms based in the EU and well-acquainted with local market conditions.
3 The debate was initiated by Cline (1982) and Ranis (1985). Empirical evidence with respect to declining terms of
trade due to export expansion is provided by Liicke (1993) and Faini et al. (1992). An up-to-date summary of the
debate, and a discussion of welfare effects of export expansion in a general equilibrium context, are given in Martin
(1993).
3
9 This is the result, for example, of the CGE simulations by Martin (1993) where the general equilibrium effects
discussed in the following are quantified.
4^ They range from so-called bilateral cumulation (EU donor content plus value added of a single CEEC), via diagonal
cumulation (bilateral cumulation plus value added of CEEC partners that are linked to the EU by several agreements;
EU/Visegrad/Bulgaria/Romania), and European cumulation (EU plus remaining EFTA countries/Visegrad/
Bulgaria/Romania) to full cumulation (all processing within an all-embracing European trade zone without inputs
necessarily having to originate from one of the partner countries).
4
1 For details on the initial agreements see Richter and Toth (1994) and Inotai (1994).44
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